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THE CREDENTIALS OF OUR COMMUNION

II.

In the first of these articles we examined the attitude of the Anglican Church toward the Creeds and Conciliar definitions of the Church which have found general acceptance among Catholic Christians. For this purpose it was found convenient to confine our attention to those great controversies concerning the faith which took place during the first five centuries. We have now to consider certain historical matters which are concerned rather with the question of Order than of Faith, and it will be necessary at this point briefly to examine the nature of the Reformation settlement in this country. It is, however, of first-rate importance that the Reformation should not be considered as an isolated event, but rather as the culmination of certain tendencies of thought and action which had their root in a remote past, and began to find outward and authoritative expression in the Conciliar movement of the fifteenth century. The bearing of this movement on the events of the present day has not been sufficiently considered. Five centuries have elapsed since its beginning, and its lessons should be sufficiently obvious to the impartial student of ecclesiastical history. The immediate object of the movement was the healing of the schism in the papacy, and in this it was successful, but the work of the Councils brought to light certain important tendencies of thought which had for long been latent in the Church, and which at last found something like adequate expression. Though successful in its immediate object, the Conciliar movement was in itself a failure. The proposed Reformation of the Church in head and members, though urged by the most enlightened of the fathers, was never seriously undertaken. The papacy emerged triumphant, and the victory of the party of the Curia paved the way for a schism more grievous than any which the Church had hitherto witnessed: but the fate of the Conciliar movement might have been far otherwise had the counsels of the more enlightened prevailed; and its work had not been entirely forgotten

four and a half centuries later, when the fatal decisions of the Vatican Council of 1870 completed the work of the reactionary party of the fourteenth century. An eminent modern historian has asserted that "probably the most revolutionary official document in the history of the world is the decree of the Council of Constance, asserting its superiority to the Pope." The authority of this decree was upheld by distinguished theologians, especially those of the University of Paris, until comparatively recent times. It was accepted by the historians and theologians who opposed the decrees of 1870, and it is instructive to observe the methods by which it is repudiated by those who uphold the modern doctrine of papal infallibility. The theory of the Church which it implies is one which has its roots in remote antiquity, and, as we shall hope to show, it has survived as far as the West is concerned in the Church of England alone.

But it is not only in its dealings with the question of the relations of Pope and Council that the Conciliar movement is of especial value to us at the present day. Its desire for the reconciliation of the East and West, its realization of the gravity of the abuses prevalent in the Church, its desire for a better adjustment of the relation between Church and State, have all their exact parallels in modern times. In these generous impulses we cannot fail to see the movement of the Holy Spirit. It is impossible to doubt that had the Conciliar movement been true to the ideals of the most enlightened of its members, the disastrous schism of the sixteenth century would have been averted. A united and purified Church would have been able to cope with the intellectual and social problems of the age of the Renaissance, problems which are in so many particulars similar to those of the present day. The Conciliar movement was essentially democratic, and had it succeeded the Church would have been able to mould on Christian lines those democratic tendencies which under the stress of ecclesiastical persecution have so often proved the bitterest foes of Christianity itself. But if we are able to perceive the workings of the Holy Spirit in the more generous and enlightened impulses which actuated the Conciliar movement, we are equally able at this lapse of time to ascertain the motives by which these impulses were thwarted. Generally speaking, they were motives of self-interest. The reformation of the Church was never seriously undertaken, because it was impossible for those who were responsible for it to agree to the reformation of the particular department to which they belonged. Each was anxious to reform the other, but unwilling to abandon its own particular privileges. As might have been expected, political intrigue was rampant, and so at Constance we have the miserable spectacle of prelates and theologians convinced that reform is necessary, but unable to unite on any measure of importance, save that of treach-

erously condemning to the flames as a heretic one whose safe conduct had been guaranteed by imperial authority. The lesson from these facts is obvious, and should safeguard us from holding any mechanical theory of guidance for any Council, however legitimately assembled. The Divine method is not a method of coercion, and this is true corporately as well as individually. The low moral standard of the age, the prevalence of party strife, the virulence of political intrigue, the motives of self-interest and personal aggrandizement worked together to nullify the efforts of the more enlightened party at Constance and Basle. Yet the witness of the same Spirit is eternal. The principles for which Gerson and Peter D'Ailly contended may still be the ideals in a modified form at the present day, and the realization of the causes of their failure may be the ground of hope for a greater success in the future.

It is impossible here to enter into historical details, but the efforts of the Conciliar movement to bring about the reunion of East and West may be taken as an illustration of what has just been said. At the beginning of the fifteenth century the evils of schism were brought prominently before men's minds by the schism within the papacy itself, and the necessity for healing this breach awakened the idea of the reunion of all catholic Christendom. Some efforts in this direction were already made at Constance, but without very much success. The negotiations between Eugenius IV. and the Council of Basle, though they do little credit to either, show sufficiently clearly that the matter had not been dropped. Finally negotiations were brought to a head at the Council of Florence, where an agreement was reached, and reunion momentarily accomplished. The history of the Council of Florence is in the highest degree depressing and discouraging, and the only person who comes out of it with much credit is perhaps the fanatical opponent of reunion, Mark of Ephesus. The Greeks, as is well known, repudiated the agreement as soon as it was made known by the Emperor on his return to Constantinople. If we examine the matter a little more closely the reason for the failure is obvious. Eugenius IV. seems primarily actuated by motives of personal aggrandizement and the desire to establish the claims of the papacy as against the refractory Council of Basle. The Greeks had no genuine desire for reunion, but were moved by motives of self-preservation, and the desire for military and naval help against the encroachments of the Turk. The schism between East and West remained unhealed, and henceforth little attention was paid to the matter. The Conciliar movement had failed in this and in practically all else. The triumph of the papacy was destined to wait for its completion till July, 1870, when the decree of papal infallibility was pronounced, and the theory of the party of the Curia

reached its logical fulfilment. Yet it is fair to say that the protests of the great theologians who opposed the decree of infallibility were altogether in line with the opinions of those doctors of the Conciliar movement who were striving for a reformation of the Church and a theory of the papacy which, had it prevailed, might have resulted in the reunion of the Church and saved it from the schism of the sixteenth century. A century later the storm of the Reformation broke over Europe. The reformation of the Latin Church was undertaken at Trent with a greater measure of success than at Constance or Basle. But by this time Northern Europe had repudiated the papal obedience, and following the leadership of Luther, Calvin, and Zwingli, made a definite breach with the past. The old catholic hierarchy was abandoned, and the supremacy of Scripture over tradition asserted, and along with countless abuses much which had been characteristic of the historic Church from the earliest days was emphatically rejected.

In England events took a different course, and here the Reformation resulted in something of the nature of a compromise. We must confine ourselves to a bare statement of fact, without entering into a consideration of the causes which produced the results we are about to consider. The main difference between the English and continental reformations is clearly the desire for continuity which characterized the settlement in this country. The outstanding fact was the preservation of the historic ministry. There was also among the majority of English Churchmen a considered and consistent appeal to Christian antiquity, and a desire to remain faithful to those beliefs and practices which could be proved to have been of general acceptance from early days. Generally speaking, the Reformation in England was far less catastrophic than that which occurred on the Continent. It was not, of course, free from elements of violence and fanaticism, but the fanaticism was for the most part due to the influence of continental reformers who settled in this country, and the violence to political reasons or motives of rapacity. It is, however, a very noteworthy fact that the opinions of the moderate party prevailed, and that the stability and influence of this school of thought was able to survive the fiery test of the Puritan onslaught in the middle of the seventeenth century. At the time of the Restoration the Church of England emerges from the trial which it had endured with something like a settled theological position. Its attitude towards Rome is clearly defined, but its differentiation from continental Protestantism is not less obvious. Yet in spite of undoubted learning and piety it must be admitted that there is something narrow and insular about its conceptions. Attacked, as it were, on all sides, it resorted to methods of self-preservation which were to a large extent similar to those coercive measures which it so strongly denounced in its adversaries.

But the Church of England, which had survived the Puritan onslaught of the seventeenth century, was destined to endure a yet severer trial. Deprived of many of the most enthusiastic supporters of its characteristic principles by the secession of the non-jurors, and delivered to the power of the statesmen of the Hanoverian period, it lost during the eighteenth century most of its spiritual vitality. Latitudinarianism and the hatred of enthusiasm chilled its spiritual and devotional life. Self-seeking and unconscientious divines occupied positions of authority and trust. Pluralism was rampant, and the avarice and indifference of the clergy alienated the sympathies of the people. On the other hand, it should be remembered that a considerable amount of genuine piety survived in a quiet and unobtrusive way, as can be seen from such writings of the period as *The Vicar of Wakefield*. Early in the nineteenth century, at the time of the Reform Bill, the position looked black indeed. Something had been done by the great evangelical revival to restore the spiritual life of the nation, but this had been repressed and discouraged by the Church, and the lines on which it was conducted were directly contrary to Anglican tradition; Nonconformity had become a spiritual force, and the attitude of the Church towards the sects produced a bitterness and hostility among them which has survived to the present day, and for which no small measure of justification can rightly be claimed. It was just at this period that the Oxford movement arose, and this movement had primarily for its object the vindication of those principles which the Church of England had adopted at the time of the Reformation settlement. The nature of this settlement was investigated, and the principles of Anglicanism clearly and vigorously asserted. The claims of the historic ministry were once more recognized, the value of the sacramental system was clearly demonstrated, the claims and discipline of the Catholic Church were vindicated by a number of able and well-informed writers. It is unnecessary here to dwell on the hostility which this movement aroused. It is sufficient to note certain of its chief consequences. Less than a hundred years have passed since its inception, yet the far-reaching character of its results can scarcely be exaggerated. Under its influence Church life has revived in most unlikely quarters. The discipline and worship of the Church has been revolutionized, and it is not too much to say that even those who are still its opponents have adopted in externals at least methods and practices which in early days of the movement were characterized as extreme. And the activity of this movement has not been confined to this country alone. It is at least as obvious in certain dependencies of the Empire as in the mother country. The episcopate, which in the days of the Reform Bill was in danger of being regarded as a superfluous department of the Civil Service, has reasserted its spiritual character, increased in numbers, and

extended its influence to an extent which will best be measured by the great assembly which is meeting this year at Lambeth. The training and education of the clergy has undergone a complete change, and the conception of the sacred ministry now widely prevalent among Anglicans is such as would be expected by those who accept and value the doctrine of Apostolic Succession. Sacramental teaching, wellnigh forgotten a century ago, is assuming a prominence which is natural to a catholic conception. Frequent Communion is the usual custom among the instructed laity, and altars which in time past were left unheeded for months at a stretch are now used daily for the celebration of the holy mysteries. Thousands resort to the Sacrament of Penance, and questions relating to such matters as the Invocation of Saints and the liturgical use of the reserved Sacrament are constantly and hotly debated. Nor is this movement confined to the clergy, as has sometimes been assumed. The laity take at least an equal part, and if it be true in years past that the clergy had difficulty in inducing the laity to follow them, it is not less true that to-day many of the clergy find it difficult to restrain the enthusiasm of their lay supporters. Now, these are matters of fact, and not conjecture. To some they will be welcome, to others highly distasteful. But by all they must be considered, and the theological and historical implication of these facts is deserving of careful investigation. We will consider the latter question now, reserving the former for the concluding article of this series.

The nineteenth century witnessed the revival in a very real sense of interest in history and archæology. Starting with a somewhat emotional and romantic movement, it developed into a school of scientific historical research unparalleled for its exactitude and minuteness. The emotional and æsthetic love of the past needed the salutary corrective of this sober-minded and impartial research, but the combined effect of these two activities has been to produce in the minds of the more intelligent an appreciation of the value of continuity. Side by side with this the great strides made by physical science during the same period resulted at first in a materialistic philosophy hostile to all religious conceptions, which was, however, destined in its turn to give place to a wider and profounder conception which had room for both psychological and historical considerations. The resultant of all these and other forces which have not been mentioned is only now in these latter days making itself perceptibly felt. But generally speaking its tendency is such as to justify in the main that conception which is characteristic of the Church of England.

Certain other tendencies which have shown themselves powerful in still more recent times must be considered in this connection, and foremost among these we must place the national idea and the

federal conception of Empire. The modern thinker conceives of nationality in terms of psychology, and is prepared to make due allowance for a considerable divergence of outward expression of the same fundamental idea or tendency. There is little room in modern conceptions for the idea of autocracy. To think imperially is to think in terms of a federation of nations, and not to see things through the eyes of an individual autocrat. It may be hard to forecast the future of Europe or the world, but it is at least certain that autocracy has passed away, and that national ideals have finally taken the place of mediæval dreams of world-wide empire. The League of Nations is surely no empty dream, and the fundamentally Christian conception which underlies this idea is bound to react in its turn on our theory of the organization of the Church. If that be so, there must be room for national Churches. This ideal, as we have seen, was not inconsistent with the aims of the Conciliar movement. It is possible that even now it has not entirely died in France; it is certain that if it has died it was after a long and painful struggle. In England it has been otherwise; the idea of a national Church, or, as we should rather say, the Church of a federation of free nations, has survived all the storms and trials which have occurred since the Reformation period. It is true that the idea is beset with many difficulties, and that the attempt to pursue it as an idea without having due regard to actual facts has produced countless irritating and harmful legal abstractions. Neither England as a country nor the British Dominions as an empire are essentially Christian, nor is it true that the Christianity of all the members of the British nation or the British Empire is of one kind, but the fact remains that there exists in our nation and empire as a reality a great society of men and women which can claim continuity with the past, which has preserved unimpaired the essentials of Catholic doctrine and order, and which has now for three centuries survived the attacks or allurements of either Rome or Geneva. Very much remains still to be done, and above all it is necessary to make some essential changes in the relationship between Church and State. A beginning has been made already by the Enabling Bill; how it will work out we cannot yet tell, but that more remains to be done is beyond question.

Yet a fair prospect opens out before our eyes. After three centuries of struggle the English Church has vindicated her existence and is continuously proving herself to be more in line with those ancient Churches of the East which are at last beginning to understand her, and with which the prospect of reunion is almost in sight.

The more recent developments of Latin Christianity should in themselves prove a sufficient justification for the line which the English Church has taken. On the other hand the whole history in

modern times of the nonconformist bodies seems to prove that they are exactly lacking in that which the Church of England possesses, and that the lack of this historical continuity is itself the very reason why they are lacking in coherence and vitality. It is contended, then, that an impartial survey of history justifies our position, and provides us with a hope that the Church of England will take no small part in the future of that great work of conquest and evangelization which lies before the whole Catholic Church. It is especially the history of the past five hundred years which justifies this point of view, and we come back to the starting-point of our investigations—the Conciliar movement of the fifteenth century as the period which contains the most valuable lessons for our present purpose.

With regard to this period, the greatest authority of modern times was undoubtedly Bishop Creighton. "His most profound research," says Dr. Figgis in an appreciation of his work, "lay in a period scarcely known to Englishmen, yet worthier of study than many of the more picturesque epochs of Church history—the period of the Conciliar movement—roughly speaking, 1378-1450. The interest of this period does not lie in the practical success of the movement, which was little or none, but in the ideas which animated it. Broadly speaking, it may be said that those ideas and those ideas alone form the *raison d'être* of the Church of England, as against Ultramontanism on the one hand and individualistic Protestant sectarianism on the other . . . the ideals of Gerson and his congeners were those of a reformed Episcopal Communion with nationalism recognized in the Church as a real thing . . . with federalism in the Church preserving the unity of the whole while securing the independence of the parts" (Figgis, *Churches in the Modern State*, p. 235).

The value and importance of this idea are immeasurable. As yet it has not been fully realized that apart from the Church of England it would by now have been extinct in the West. Perhaps it may be given to us not merely to keep it alive but ultimately to secure its universal acceptance.

H. Leonard Pass.

(*To be concluded.*)

WHAT IS THE PROBLEM OF EVIL?

The object of this paper is to point out what seems to be a confusion of thought as to the exact nature of this problem and the ground it covers. In any form the problem involves three terms: the goodness of God, His omnipotence, and the existence of evil. These three terms give together a dilemmatic argument in the

following shape. If God wills the evil which exists, He is not good; if He does not will it, He is not omnipotent. But, since it certainly exists, He either wills it or does not will it; therefore He is either not good or not omnipotent. The " problem of evil " consists in the attempt to refute this dilemma without denying the reality of any of the three terms, since neither can be denied without the destruction of our religious beliefs.

As stated, this is an impossible task. The dilemma does not admit of direct refutation. Only three courses are open: to give up the problem—that is, to abandon the whole of theology and the whole of philosophy (for the problem of evil, *mutatis terminis*, reappears with exactly the same force in every moral philosophy); to give in to it—that is, to accept the dilemma as cogent and to deny the reality of one of the three terms, it does not much matter which; or thirdly, to manipulate the terms of the dilemma, by a criticism and re-exposition of the conceptions involved in the hope of so reinterpreting them that they are no longer irreconcilable. The first method is the suicide of religion; the second its violent self-mutilation, likely to result in its bleeding to death; the third is arduous and responsible, but alone possible.

The backbone of any discussion of the " problem of evil " will therefore be a critical exposition of the three conceptions of omnipotence, goodness and evil. In so far as any discussion has at all cleared up one of these conceptions, it has justified itself; in so far as it has defined them all in a way which both satisfies their function in the religious consciousness and at the same time dissolves the original dilemma, the problem will have received at any rate some kind of a solution.

It is not the object of this paper to contribute anything positive towards this end—an end, however, which must not be regarded as in any special sense unattainable. There is a sense in which every speculative problem is insoluble—for no problem can ever be solved in such a way that it need never be reconsidered in the light of new thought; in another sense all are soluble, the problem of evil no less than the others. My object here is only to clear the path for such an advance by removing a certain confusion as to the scope of the conception—and therefore the problem—of evil.

It is usual to begin any discussion of the problem by distinguishing two or more aspects of it—that is to say, two or more main ramifications of the concept of evil. The two most commonly enumerated are sin and pain; evil in the sense of undesirable actions and evil in the sense of undesirable passive states. Sin is evil in the sense that a person who sins is wicked, and therefore one who causes (or when he could prevent it allows) another to sin is wicked; therefore the existence of sin disproves the goodness, or, if not the goodness,

the omnipotence, of God. Pain is evil in the sense that it ought not to exist, and therefore one who creates it by inflicting it upon another (or permits another to suffer it when he could prevent it) is wicked; therefore the existence of pain leads independently to the same conclusion.

On the whole, more weight is commonly laid on the " problem of pain " than on the " problem of sin." This is because it is often felt that the latter difficulty is alleviated, if not entirely removed, by the recognition of the necessity for human freedom. It is taken as self-evident that man is free, and free by the will of God; and if free, free to sin. But there is no such mitigation of the " problem of pain "; and therefore when people speak of the " problem of evil " as a serious difficulty in religion or apologetics they often refer primarily, if not exclusively, to this problem.

I shall try to show in this paper that the identification of the problem of pain with a part or the whole of the problem of evil is a fallacy, due to a philosophical error which was vigorously preached in the last century and is still by no means extinct, especially in this country, where it is on its native soil. Until this error has disappeared from the popular mind it is vain to hope for a better understanding of the problem of evil, or, indeed, of any ethical question whatever.

The philosophical error to which I refer is the doctrine that when we call an act good we do so with reference to certain good consequences which it produces or is intended to produce. That which is " good " *par excellence* is a thing, an event, a condition; the will is called good only in a secondary sense, in so far as it creates or tries to create things and conditions which are good. A good act is thus defined as such by reference to its consequences, whether actual, probable, or intended; but a thing or event is good (or bad) simply in itself. The good will is good because it is a means to good ends.

This idea, which I shall call utilitarianism, because it is as a matter of fact the fundamental principle of the ethics known as utilitarian, is thrown into sharp relief if we compare it with the famous opening of Kant's great essay on the good will. " There is nothing in the world, or even out of it, which can be called good without qualification, except a good will." Physical and mental endowments, the virtues and the affections, the gifts of fortune—all these things are doubtless good in a sense; each of them is good in certain respects, and relatively to certain ends or conceptions of the end; but none of them can be called good without qualification, because each can be turned to the service of evil. Thus, whatever goodness we ascribe to these things is, as it were, a mere reflection of the goodness of the will. The only sense in which we can ascribe

to them a goodness of their own is that they possess a kind of secondary goodness—the goodness of means to an end.

But this is exactly the kind of goodness which utilitarianism ascribes to the will. Thus, the two views are exactly antithetical. For Kant, whose view I shall designate by the name ethical, the good will alone is in the strict sense good—good as an end in itself; all other things are only good in a secondary or derivative sense, good as means. For utilitarianism, the good will is good in just this secondary or derivative sense; all that is fully and strictly good—good as an end—is the things which the will sets out to create.

We may perhaps conveniently distinguish the two views by making a distinction in the meaning of the word good. Good may mean, first, good in itself, as an end; or, secondly, good in a derivative sense, as a means. The utilitarian view of morality consists in maintaining that the good will is good in the latter sense, which we shall accordingly refer to as the utilitarian sense of the word. The ethical view maintains that the good will is good in the former sense; this sense, therefore, we shall name the ethical sense of the word. The utilitarian view implies that the phrases "duty," "morally good," and so on, as applied to actions or to the will, mean "good in the sense of means to an ulterior end"; the ethical or Kantian view interprets these same expressions as meaning "good in the absolute, unqualified sense—good, that is, as an end in itself."

This distinction between the utilitarian and the ethical or Kantain view of the good will is of course familiar to every student of philosophy, but it seems desirable to state it here with the utmost possible clearness because it underlies every discussion of the problem of evil. The utilitarian conception has had great influence in this country over a long period of time, and the criticisms of it, however damaging and final, have hardly touched the popular mind. The Kantian doctrine would imply that an event, a state of things, something that simply is or simply happens, can never claim the title good in its own right. It is only good if the will which created it was a good will; otherwise it may be useful for this or that end, but it cannot be properly described as good; and when it can be so described, this is only because it takes a moral colouring from the morality of the will to which it was due. In England the utilitarian morality has sunk so deeply into our minds as to make this seem a paradox. We have been schooled to believe that the word "good" attaches primarily to events and states of things, independently of the question who created them and why; and that when we call a will good, we only call it so because the events it produces are in themselves good, are events which ought to happen. This point of view makes the will a means, and never anything but a means; the will so conceived does not by being good confer goodness on the

things it does, but it derives goodness—a reflected glory—from these things, when they are good.

This paper is not an essay on pure moral philosophy, and therefore I do not intend to discuss the merits and defects of utilitarianism. I only wish to point out its fundamental feature—namely, its conception of the good will as a means, not as an end, as opposed to the Kantian conception of the good will as an end in itself—and to express the conviction that in this matter the utilitarian point of view is hopelessly wrong, and the Kantian conception at least sound on fundamentals. Out of the utilitarian view no sound or healthy philosophical results have proceeded or are likely to proceed; in order to make any progress in moral speculation one must begin by agreeing with Kant that the problem of goodness is the problem of the good will; and if this is so, the problem of evil is the problem of the evil will.

It is true that Kant did not succeed in his attempt to develop his conception into a system of ethics. The attempt broke down with great completeness. But it is possible to admit this and yet to maintain that his starting-point was right—was, in fact, the only possible one. Kant's system broke down because he never discovered how to make use of his starting-point; he never found the road away from it, the link by which he could connect it with the concrete facts of the moral life. It is the germ of a system, but in his hands it remained a germ. Here, again, I am summarily expressing philosophical conclusions which this is not the place to defend or even to expound in detail.

The problem of evil, then, is the problem of the evil will. For that alone is evil which ought to have been and might have been good; and if the term good in its moral sense is applicable to the will alone, so is, in the same moral sense, the term evil. And this is the sense which the word bears when we speak of the problem of evil. No doubt the utilitarian sense of the word good (good for some end beyond itself) is paralleled by a utilitarian sense of the word evil. We speak, and quite legitimately, of bad boots, just as we speak of good boots. But when we speak of a pair of boots as good, we mean good for some special purpose—good for country wear, or the like. So, when we speak of bad boots, we mean bad for the purpose which we had in mind, though possibly quite good for other purposes—for fuel, or for starting sweet-peas in. But this sense of the word bad can hardly be said to give rise to a problem of evil. At most, it raises the question why we should want to use things for purposes to which they are not adapted; and this may lead us, by way of the conception of stupidity, to the problem of error and so back to the problem of evil; but the connection is a remote one.

Let us now return to the division which we found observed by

the common discussions of the problem of evil. As we saw at the beginning, we are in the habit of subdividing it into some such heads as (*a*) the problem of pain, in man and in the lower animals, (*b*) the problem of sin. Other heads are sometimes added, but on criticism they soon resolve themselves into bye-forms of one or the other. The thesis of this paper is that the latter head alone has a right to be discussed—is, in fact, a problem of evil at all; that the former, the problem of pain conceived as a division of the problem of evil, is a confusion due to the persistence of a utilitarian habit of mind.

This contention follows immediately from our main principle as to the nature of the good will. When we raise the question, How can a world created by God's good will contain evils? we are using the terms good and evil in a definitely moral sense, not in the utilitarian sense. God's will is conceived as having not the kind of goodness which we predicate of tools or implements, the goodness of a means to an ulterior end, but the absolute and self-contained goodness of an end in itself. Therefore the same sense must here attach to the term evil. The evils of which we are speaking must be things not merely evil in relation to some further end or purpose, but evil absolutely and in themselves. That is to say, they can only be sins, acts of the evil will.

It may be useful to develop this conclusion in a little more detail by some observations on the subject of the so-called "problem of pain" regarded as one side of the problem of evil.

The "problem of pain" consists in the question, How can God, being omnipotent and benevolent, cause or permit pain? The crucial point in this question is the introduction of the word benevolent as a substitute for the word good. The two terms are not equivalent. To be benevolent is to shrink from the pain of another; it is the opposite of being cruel or vindictive. An amiable trait, certainly; but not an adequate description of the whole content of the good will. A will that was benevolent and nothing more would be very far from ideally good; and, in fact, we do not use the epithet as in any sense fully descriptive except in the case of a certain type of slightly imbecile old gentleman whom we meet in the pages of *Punch*. The God of Judaism is a just and a terrible God; and if the God of Christianity is a God loving and loved, no longer terrible, this is only because perfect love casts out fear, not because the God of Christianity has foregone any of the justice and holiness which made Him terrible to the Jews. Love is a fine and significant image for the relation of the good will to its own objects, an image nobler and truer even than justice; benevolence is a caricature, and expresses nothing of the nature of the good will except a mere negation, the absence of cruelty. As a predicate of God, therefore, it has value

only so long as we are in danger of conceiving Him as actively and maliciously cruel. And to-day perhaps the opposite danger is more real—the danger of conceiving God as a doting father, pushing forgiveness to the verge of sentimentality.

The fact is that in surreptitiously introducing the word benevolent as an equivalent for the word good we are guilty of an anachronism. We are unconsciously harking back to the ethics of two centuries ago, an ethics long outworn and discredited, the philosophy of the sentiments; a philosophy which to-day survives only in theological tags of this kind.

If, then, we substitute for the word benevolent the right word, good, the difficulty either disappears or at least undergoes a profound alteration. To call a thing evil (or for that matter good) in the moral sense is to call it an act of somebody's will. Nothing that merely exists or merely happens can be called an evil, but only something that is done, an action. So far as anything merely happens to us, so far as it has the quality of an event, it can have no moral predicates. "Is pain an evil?" We can only reply, To whose will are you attributing it? "Pain ought not to exist." We must reply, To say ought is to speak of a person, not a thing; an act, not an event.

In saying that pain is an evil, then, we are saying "God (or the devil) creates pain, which is a wicked action." Why do we call it wicked? Because pain is in itself an evil? No; that is to argue in a circle. The goodness or badness of a thing is a reflection of the character of the volition, not the other way round. If we know from what motives God or the devil creates pain, then we can say whether the pain so caused ought or ought not to exist. Otherwise the most we can say is that it is painful, and this must not be confused with saying that it is bad.

Much ink has been spilt over the question whether pain in itself is or is not an evil as if it were a question of opinion or of argument; but the fact seems clear that in the moral sense it is neither evil nor good, since nothing can have these predicates except the action of a will; while in the utilitarian sense it may or may not be an evil according to circumstances and to the end in view. In no case is there any contradiction in supposing that pain is caused by a good will. Indeed, it is not hard to think of cases in which the only thing a good will can do is to cause pain. Therefore the "problem of pain," whatever it may be, is not the dilemma with which we started —the flat contradiction between a good and omnipotent God on the one hand, and the existence of things which no good will could permit on the other. If we believe in God's goodness, we believe that He does not torture us out of wantonness. And if we believe in His omnipotence, we are confident that He does not let us be tortured out of helplessness. We can believe, and there is abso-

lutely nothing in the nature of things to prevent our believing, that it is good for us to have pain; that pain is a thing to thank God for, a thing without which our life would be worse than it is, a thing which marks our communion with a crucified God.

There is nothing in the nature of things to prevent our believing this. It involves no internal contradiction. On the contrary, we may acclaim it as more than a blind act of faith, as in some degree a truth of experience. We do at least dimly recognize that pain justifies itself in relation to our life as moral beings; we have even invented a phrase—self-contradictory, because it perpetuates the utilitarian confusion of pain with evil—to express this justification; we speak of the "teleological value of evil." If anything still remains of the "problem of pain," it is simply the question whether the pain of the lower animals can be justified in the same way; and here, perhaps, the act of faith must remain an act of faith.

It is not contended that the "problem of pain" vanishes entirely on examination. Our analysis of it has left two distinct residues; first, the question how exactly pain is productive of the values which could not have existed without it; and secondly, the question whether this necessity or justification of pain rests in the last resort upon the existence of the evil will; whether it can be maintained that a sinless world would be a painless world. These are problems; but they are, so to speak, straightforward problems: they are quite distinct from the problem of evil, for they have not the character which that problem has of a hopeless and unavoidable dilemma.

The result of our analysis seems to be something like this. Traditionally, the problem of evil is presented in two parts; the problem of sin and the problem of pain. These two parts are really not co-ordinate parts, but alternative presentations of the entire problem from opposing points of view. From the ethical point of view the problem is solely the problem of sin; the problem of pain is seen to be a quite different problem, presenting a quite different character. From the utilitarian point of view the real problem is the problem of pain; the problem of sin is either simply solved by the conception of human freedom, or else remains as a particular case of the problem of pain. If we regard the will as means (utilitarian view) the problem of the bad will disappears into the problem of bad events or states of things, typified by pain. If we regard the will as end (ethical view) the problem of undesirable things or events, such as pain, is swallowed up in the problem of the evil will. But if, instead of adopting either of these views, we merely halt between two opinions, then our treatment of the problem of evil will fall into the two heads which we have enumerated.

There is certainly no royal road to the solution of the problem of evil. But there are ways of making it easier or harder to advance

towards a solution. And one way of making it harder is to hesitate between two incompatible views of the nature of goodness. To those who feel that of the two opposing views each must contain some part of the truth, I would say, these parts of the truth, if they are such, can only be properly developed by careful segregation, by working out each side by itself, taking the utmost care not to confuse it with its opposite, and not attempting a synthesis before each side has become perfectly definite. To mix up the two points of view at the outset is to destroy all possibility of synthesis, because it destroys the conceptions themselves.

Pain and sin—this is our conclusion—are not two kinds or divisions of evil, but two conflicting definitions of what evil is. To treat them as co-ordinate heads of one and the same problem is to stand in self-confessed contradiction as to the fundamental nature of the problem at issue. If anyone prefers the utilitarian conception of evil, let him take it up and work it out. I have expressed my conviction that this utilitarian view is bankrupt, though I am well aware that it is maintained by perhaps a majority of modern authorities; but no one will deny that the two views are in sharp opposition, and that a treatment of a moral problem which is based on merely confusing the two is doomed in advance to failure.

Such a treatment, I suggest, we do actually find in the current approach to the problem of evil. Those who discuss the problem give one treatment of it under the heading of sin, as a concession to the ethical conception of good, and another under the heading of pain, as a concession to the utilitarians; having themselves not really made up their minds which conception they are going to adopt as their own. But this is a safe method of courting disaster. The problems are hard enough in any case; there is no need to make them harder by treating them from the standpoint of a quicksand of shifting and undetermined conceptions.

Here, in fact, as in many other cases, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that much of what now passes for " philosophy of religion " in this country—and elsewhere, for that matter—is vitiated at the start, and before the start, by a kind of philosophical eclecticism. It is seldom based on anything like a critical study of first principles; it collects its first principles from any and every source, regardless of their coherence or of their ability to stand a searching criticism. *Non tali auxilio nec defensoribus istis.* . . . Religious genius has no need of philosophical spade-work; and for the insight of religious genius the problem of sin and the problem of pain are alike solved on the Cross of Christ. But so long as religion seeks the aid of philosophical thought, she betrays her own trust if she accepts any but the best; and the best will never be so good but that it sorely needs bettering.

R. G. Collingwood.

THE LAW AND THE PROPHETS*

THE subject of this paper opens up fundamental principles. Such a title as "The Law and the Prophets" is only a disguise, under a technical form, for certain elements in religion, often supposed to be rivals, which are as much alive to-day as they were in the days of Moses and Isaiah. It is not proposed to dwell upon details, important as they are, but rather to attempt a broad treatment with illustrations from the sources on historical lines.

At the outset we must explain that by *the Law* is meant what the later Jews and the New Testament writers mean by it: the whole body of priestly tradition and legislation contained in the Books of Moses. Strictly speaking, the *Torah* was the *instruction* given by the priests on points of ceremonial or conduct, or when matters of dispute arose for decision. The word frequently has this sense in the Old Testament, but it came to be used in a more comprehensive way, and to denote what was permanent not occasional, codified not oral, the entire system, in fact, of organized religion. Similarly with *the Prophets*. At first the name was given to individuals and to a professional class; it was applied to particular cases. But as time went on, and the prophets took to writing down their message, their writings came to be classed under the title of The Prophets. Generally speaking, prophecy may be taken to represent that other aspect of religion which is concerned, not with the ordering of worship, but with God's moral requirement, with national sin and doom, with the religious interpretation of history and the working out of God's purposes for Israel and the world.

We recognize, then, a clear distinction between the aims and interests of Law and Prophecy; but we must be careful not to exaggerate it. These two religious forces were not mutually exclusive; indeed on a broad survey we are struck by the degree to which they coalesced. The prophets when they first come upon the scene appear in close association with the national worship as practised at the time. Samuel, for instance, was brought up in the sanctuary, and at the time of his greatest influence acted as both a priest and a prophet. Elijah's public ministry culminated in offering sacrifice upon an altar of Yahweh, which had been allowed to fall into ruin. Moses, who came to be regarded as the typical lawgiver, appeared to one of the earliest teachers to be rather a prophet: "By a prophet Yahweh brought Israel up out of Egypt, and by a prophet was he preserved" (Hos. xii. 13). A later reference in the Law itself describes him in the same way: "There hath not arisen a prophet

* Presidential address delivered to the Oxford Society of Historical Theology.

since in Israel like unto Moses, whom Yahweh knew face to face" (Deut. xxxiv. 10). There is nothing, I suppose, in the Pentateuch more thoroughly prophetic in character than the narrative of the covenant at Sinai in Exod. xxiv. 1-11 from J. and E. J. tells us (vv. 1, 2, 9-11) how Moses and Aaron, Nadab and Abihu and seventy of the elders, were summoned to Yahweh's presence on the mount; only Moses was allowed to draw near, but they all saw the God of Israel with the pavement of sapphire under His feet; "and they beheld God"—the word used habitually of the prophets as "seers" of "visions"—and "did eat and drink" the covenant meal. Combined with this is E's version. It describes the covenant ritual, the altar, the twelve pillars, the sacrifices, the sprinkling of the blood on altar and people. In this joint narrative the prophetic interest and the priestly reveal themselves unmistakably.

How far back and fundamental this combination was may be judged from the fact that the Decalogue, whatever view we take of its origin, represents the moral standard to which the prophets of the eighth century make their appeal. In their moral ideals the prophets and priests were at one.

The cleavage begins with written prophecy. Nothing can exceed the indignation and scorn with which Amos, Hosea and Isaiah denounce the religious worship of their time.

> Come ye to Beth-el and sin,
> In Gilgal multiply sinning;
> And bring in the morning your sacrifices,
> Your tithes on the third day.
> And burn your luscious thank-offering;
> And publish aloud your alms;
> For so ye love it, ye Israelites,—
> Is the oracle of the Lord Yahweh (Amos iv. 4, 5).

> I hate, I despise your feasts,
> I will smell no savour in your assemblies;
> For though ye offer me burnt offerings,
> And your meal offerings—I will not accept them;
> And the peace offerings of your fatlings I will not regard.
> Remove from me the noise of thy songs:
> The melody of thy viols I will not hear (*ib.* v. 21-23).

> Because Ephraim hath multiplied altars to sin,
> Altars have become sin to him . . .
> Sacrifice they love and offer it,
> Flesh, and they eat it:
> Now will I remember their iniquity,
> And visit their transgression (Hos. viii. 11, 13).

If possible, Isaiah's language is fiercer still:

> What care I for your multiplied sacrifices?
>
> says Yahweh—
>
> I am sated with the burnt offerings of rams
> And the fat of fed beasts:
> And in the blood of bulls and goats
> I have no pleasure.

When ye come to see my face
Who has required this at your hand ?
My courts to trample continue not:
Bringing oblations is an abomination to me !
New moon and sabbath I cannot endure
Fast and solemnity my soul hates !
They are become a burden to me,
I am tired of enduring them (Is. i. 11-14).

In the same strain Micah (vi. 6-8), Jeremiah (vi. 20, 21; vii. 1-15, 21-23), some of the Psalms (xl. 6-8; l. 13-15; li. 16, 17; lxix. 30 f.) and Proverbs (xv. 8; xxi. 27) carry on the denunciations. How are we to understand them ? Do the prophets declare that sacrifice is utterly displeasing to God ? Would they altogether abolish worship and the whole system of religious ordinances ? Isaiah at times, and Micah and Jeremiah, seem to exult in the prospect of the overthrow of the temple at Jerusalem and all that it stood for: do they, then, desire to abolish not merely worship, but every place of worship ?

Now it is precisely here that we need to maintain a sense of proportion. For a long time it has been the fashion among influential scholars, both at home and on the Continent, to regard the prophets as champions of a religion which has got rid of the trammels of external observances, and as possessed with the same dislike of ceremonial which is felt by a Lutheran or Zwinglian professor in the present day. Indeed it is quite usual to estimate the permanent value of a prophet's message by his attitude towards this very question, and the prophets who took an entirely different line are considered to betray a falling off in enthusiasm for the highest ends of religion. Voices have been raised in protest against this extreme view, but it is still widely held. The last book on the subject which came to us from Germany before the war, *Die Propheten*, by G. Hölscher of Göttingen, in many ways a fresh and valuable contribution, is obsessed by this idea.

But what was it in the religion of their times which roused the prophets' fire ? Briefly two things: in practice, the worship of Yahweh at the high places had become hardly distinguishable from the worship of the Canaanite Baal; and in principle, religion was popularly identified with the offering of sacrifice and the performance of mechanical rites. Both the practice and the principle called for drastic treatment in the interests of the higher faith. Against the former the prophets hurled their contempt; against the latter they asserted the moral and spiritual claim of religion: " Seek ye me that ye may live, but seek not Beth-el, nor enter into Gilgal," " Let judgment roll down as waters, and righteousness as a perennial stream " (Amos v. 4, 24); " I desire mercy and not sacrifice; and the knowledge of God more than burnt offerings " (Hos. vi. 6); " Wash you, make you clean; put away the evil of your doings from before mine eyes . . . seek judgment, relieve the oppressed, judge the father-

less, plead for the widow" (Is. i. 10 f.); "Behold, to obey is better than sacrifice, and to harken than the fat of rams" (1 Sam. xv. 22). Here we listen to the clash between the higher and lower forms of religion. It was no time for half-measures. The moral challenge is flung down without compromise or qualification; we mark exactly the same thing in our Lord's declarations of principle. But to interpret the prophets' language as calling for the abolition, in the name of God, of all the outward ordinances of religion is certainly a mistake. Worship is as old as history; the ancient mind could not conceive a religion without sacrifice or its equivalent, without a sanctuary, a priesthood, and ceremonial rites. Moreover, as I said before, the prophets themselves, either by birth or by habit, were most of them closely associated with the organized religion. From his inside knowledge of what was going on, we are inclined to think that Hosea belonged to the priestly class; Isaiah was accustomed to worship in the temple, and received his call while actually engaged in worship there; Jeremiah was "of the priests that were in Anathoth"; Ezekiel, perhaps the most influential of all the prophets, was a priest, and most likely had ministered in the temple before the captivity. So we might go on with the others. But what I would ask you to notice as peculiarly significant is this: the earliest book (as distinct from a brief code) of religious legislation, Deuteronomy, was clearly the production of Law and Prophecy working hand in hand. It aimed at nothing short of a revolution in popular practice by abolishing the local sanctuaries and concentrating all sacrifice at Jerusalem. Perhaps, as the latest commentator on Deuteronomy, Dr. G. A. Smith, says, this courageous measure owed more to the teaching of experience than to the instigation of prophecy; the idolatrous tendencies of the worship at many altars had become too glaring to be disregarded any longer. But thoroughly prophetic is all that the new law-book lays down as to the essence of spiritual religion and the moral requirement of Israel's God; indeed Deuteronomy sums up, with a force and clearness which had not hitherto been reached, the very principles for which the prophets had contended: "Hear, O Israel, Yahweh our God is one Yahweh; and thou shalt love Yahweh thy God." It is the great declaration of monotheism, and of monotheism involving moral conduct, henceforward incorporated in the Law.

Time, of course, was needed for the new legislation to take effect. The leading prophet of the Deuteronomic age was Jeremiah, and we naturally want to know how he regarded the movement. He must have been in sympathy with it, for the aim of Deuteronomy was identical with his own. But his attitude is difficult to make out. We do not know for certain that he took any part in the reform (but see xi. 1-14); perhaps he was more inclined to favour its principles

than convinced of the wisdom of its methods. Clearly much remained to be done before the joint effort of lawgivers and prophets could purge the popular religion. Then came the Exile and all its momentous consequences. In Babylon the faithful at any rate were compelled to practise their religion without sacrifice; at the same time Sabbath and circumcision gained a new value as preservatives of the ancestral faith. But what we notice about prophecy at this period is its interest in the Law. Ezekiel's tone is charged with all the great notes of his predecessors, perhaps with a more strident emphasis; but he contributes a new feature—a detailed scheme for the organization of sacrifice and worship, developed on the lines of Deuteronomy and earlier practice. The second Isaiah glows with the true prophetic wrath against idolatry and moral failure, and with large visions of a Divine deliverance and of Israel's function as the missionary of the true faith; but he fixes his hopes on the restoration of Zion, of the temple and its worship. The prophets on the spot, when the exiles had begun to return, insist upon the rebuilding of the temple as the first and foremost duty, the very condition of the arrival of the Davidic king and the blessings of the new age. It is true that Haggai and Zechariah were not gifted with the style and imagination of their predecessors, but to argue that they were inferior in religious capacity because they shift the emphasis from moral reformation to the externals of religion is to misinterpret the situation. As a matter of fact both these prophets make their moral appeal,* but the times were changed and fresh problems had arisen; the need of the moment was to safeguard the struggling community which clung to the higher faith, and to discover the right form through which the religious spirit could find expression. "We must have our temple and altar," cry the prophets; but they show themselves to be in the true succession by connecting the outward fabric with high hopes and aims, a shaking of the nations as the prelude to Yahweh's intervention and the flow of homage from the heathen to the new temple and kingdom. It is significant of the prophetic attitude at this period that while Zechariah is told to make a crown and set it on the head of the Davidic prince (vi. 9-15, text corrected vv. 10, 11; cf. 14), yet he treats Joshua, the high priest, as the representative of the people before God, so that when Joshua is symbolically cleansed the people are cleansed; he and his fellow-priests are "men of omen" (iii. 8), a pledge of the approach of the Messianic Kingdom.

This was in 520 B.C. Some eighty years later we come to the introduction of the Priestly Code and the establishment of the full system of organized religion. Are we to look upon this as the triumph of Law over Prophecy, of the outward over the inward, of mechanical observances over moral and spiritual service? We

* Hag. i. 2, 4, 9; Zech. vii. 9 f.; i 2 6; viii. 16, 17.

must not allow our prepossessions or later developments to settle the question. For underlying the Law is the profoundly spiritual conception of Yahweh's holiness; He is the all-holy God, and He demands holiness in His people as a condition of their union with Himself. The lawgivers had made an earlier attempt to work out this conception in detail (The Law of Holiness, Lev. xvii.-xxvi.); but experience showed that more careful and elaborate regulation was necessary. The great aim both of priests and of prophets was to preserve the distinctive character of Israel's religion, to save it from contamination, to concentrate and fix it. They took care to incorporate the ancient provisions of the moral law—*i.e.*, the Ten Words, which formed the basis of the prophetic appeal, while they reformed and enforced the traditional practice of sacrificial worship and festivals and rites of purification. It was, in fact, a triumph of prophecy supported by law, for the substance of the prophetic teaching, monotheism in creed and morality in conduct, was now enshrined in a complete system, which came to represent a high standard of religious belief and practice, passionately cherished by the most spiritual minds in the nation. How dear the temple and its worship had become to the heart of later Judaism we learn from many of the Psalms. The λειτουργία of sacrifice, fast and festival, the whole system of the Law, so far from being (as we sometimes wrongly imagine) a yoke and burden on the necks of the faithful, was their joy and satisfaction, an outlet of their feelings (note *nibba'* of the temple-singers, 1 Chron. xxv. 1-3), the great romance of life; "the law of thy mouth is better unto me than thousands of gold and silver"; "sweeter also than honey and the droppings of the comb" (Ps. cxix. 72, xix. 10). A new figure now makes its appearance in religious circles, that of the scribe, who devoted himself, like Ezra, to three things: the study, the practice, and the teaching of the Law (Ezra vii. 10).

But we must glance at the other side of the picture. Human nature being what it is, the legal system easily hardened into mechanism and lack of vision. One of the last of the canonical prophets, he who is disguised under the name of Malachi, himself an enthusiastic upholder of the temple worship, has some hard sayings about the priests of his day (Mal. ii. 8, 9). He attacks them on much the same grounds as the prophets had done in the ages before him (Hos. iv. 6 ff., Is. xxviii. 7, Mic. iii. 11, Jer. v. 31; xxxiii. 11, etc.). If it was only too easy for the priests to deteriorate, so it was for the prophets. We have abundant evidence of that.

Prophecy throughout its history was always in danger of becoming professional and mercenary, and ready to sacrifice truth to expediency (Hos. iv. 5, Is. xxviii. 7, Mic. iii. 5 ff., Jer. xxiii. 11, Ezek. xiii.). The last prophets mentioned by name in

the Old Testament were hirelings in the pay of the party who opposed Nehemiah and his gallant efforts on behalf of Church and State (Neh. vi. 1-14). Some hundred years or more later, in the Greek period, we hear of prophecy still surviving, but discredited and in ill repute; though the hairy mantle was occasionally to be seen, the prophetic spirit was fled and gone (Zech. xiii. 1-6). The chronicler realized that the succession had come to an end; prophecy was a thing of the past, the present must do without it; as a late Psalmist laments: "There is no more any prophet; neither is there among us any that knoweth how long" (Ps. lxxiv. 9). The same regret is heard in the Maccabean Age (1 Macc. iv. 46, ix. 27). Nevertheless the prophetic writings lived on, and were eagerly studied and annotated and interpreted afresh. The ideals remained with all their power of kindling hope and vision, and the Law furnished a background of disciplined religious life from which the ideals could take form and bear fruit. The combination of the two was vital to religion, if law was to be saved from formalism, and prophecy from the empty fate of dreams. Meanwhile, however, the apocalyptic seers, though not officially recognized, took up the task at the point where prophecy laid it down. Organized religion looked askance at them; people who regarded the Law as the final word of God refused to entertain the possibility of a new message; and the apocalyptists were forced to assume the cloak of some ancient name to secure currency for their writings. Yet not a few of them went as far as any Jew could go in exalting the Law as the way of life and righteousness (*e.g.*, Apoc. Baruch and 4 Ezra): others, again, made the Messiah and the restoration of Jerusalem and the final catastrophe the centre of their interests. At times we notice a remarkable fusing of the aims of law and prophecy in the expectation of a Messiah who is to be a priest; the conception is thought to have taken its rise from the actual union of priesthood and kingship in the person of John Hyrcanus and others of the Maccabean priest-kings. The Testaments especially are full of this idea. The priestly Messiah is to spring from the tribe of Levi (Levi xviii.); he is to establish a new priesthood (Levi viii. 14) and at the same time he is to be a prophet of the Most High (Levi viii. 15), and apparently a mediator for the Gentiles (*ib.*); to overthrow the enemies of Israel, and open paradise to the saints (Reuben vi. 12, etc., Levi xviii. 10, Dan. v. 10 ff.).

This is but one illustration of the lofty hopes, truly prophetic in character, which were cherished at the very time when the Law was stiffening its ring fence. We have reached a point from which we can look back over the course of religious history which we have followed in outline. We have arrived at the establishment of the great creed of monotheism, essentially prophetic in character and outlook, for it is essentially universalist, intended to be the creed of

all mankind, the basis of true religion everywhere; and this prophetic belief in the One, all-holy God is expressed in practice by an elaborated system of religious observance. Our survey leads us to recognize that it was God's will to consecrate the outward organized practice of religion, as well as its inward individual principle: the one was needed to safeguard and secure the other. At the same time we recognize an incongruity, a limitation: a universal creed enshrined in a national, even a local, cult. The prophets and the apocalyptic seers, for all their wide-ranging visions, invariably fix the climax at Zion and the glorification of Israel; the lawgivers, the champions of the legal system, are even more particularist. The theory, in fact, was too big for the practice. We seem to have come to an end of the advance along these lines: the rabbinic Judaism which followed offers "a pathetic instance of arrested development." Such is our impression as we look back; and as we look forward from this point the teaching of Jesus Christ arrives to guide us. With what mastery and insight He handles the situation! He will destroy nothing; His purpose is to fulfil both Law and Prophecy and in fulfilling to give them a new direction. Apocalypse had succeeded to the function of Prophecy; our Lord takes up the apocalyptic tradition as a congenial starting-point for His own teaching, but He uses it as a master, not a servant. He retains all that was best in the Law and spiritualizes it, but with Divine authority He claims to supersede it and to dispense His followers from observing it. National and local elements were swept away; the inherent incongruity between the creed and the ritual of Judaism was replaced by a new order, in which the practice is made conformable to the theory.

Thus Law and Prophecy represent abiding elements in the life of religion as interpreted by Jesus Christ. The large lesson of history is that they must be preserved in combination; they are not rivals. We need the sense of contact between God and the human soul, the vision, the perception of Divine purposes, which belong to prophecy, in order to vitalize the outward forms of religious worship. We need also the discipline of ordered rites and obligations to train the spiritual vision, to preserve prophecy from falsehood and self-will. The Church soon discovered that the difference between the Old Testament and the New lay not in the abolition of sacrifice, but in the change of its direction. Our worship, and our whole effort of religious brotherhood and service, culminates in an act of sacrifice; we commemorate an Offering once made and never to be repeated; we plead it, we unite ourselves with it; and in this One Oblation we see a prophecy of God's purpose of salvation for the world.

G. A. Cooke.

ADVERSARIA EXEGETICA

St. John iii. 1-21.

1. Now there was a man of the Pharisees, named Nicodemus, a ruler of the Jews:

2. The same came to Jesus by night, and said to him, Rabbi, we know that thou art a teacher come from God: for no man can do these signs that thou doest, except God be with him.

3. Jesus answered and said unto him, Verily, verily, I say unto thee, Except a man be born $\frac{\text{from above,}}{\text{again,}}$ he cannot see the kingdom of God.

4. Nicodemus saith unto him, How can a man be born when he is old? can he enter a second time into his mother's womb, and be born?

5. Jesus answered, Verily, verily, I say unto thee, Except a man be born of water and the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God.

6. That which is born of the flesh is flesh; and that which is born of the Spirit is spirit.

7. Marvel not that I said unto thee, Ye must be born $\frac{\text{from above.}}{\text{again.}}$

8. The $\frac{\text{wind bloweth where it listeth,}}{\text{Spirit breathes where he wills,}}$ and thou hearest $\frac{\text{its noise,}}{\text{his voice,}}$ but thou knowest not whence $\frac{\text{it}}{\text{he}}$ cometh, and whither $\frac{\text{it}}{\text{he}}$ goeth.

9. Nicodemus answered and said unto him, How can these things be?

10. Jesus answered and said unto him, Art thou the teacher of Israel, and understandest not these things?

11. Verily, verily, I say unto thee, We speak that we do know, and bear witness of that we have seen; and ye receive not our witness.

12. If I told you earthly things, and ye believe not, how shall ye believe, if I tell you heavenly things?

13. And no man hath ascended into heaven, but he that descended out of heaven, even the Son of man which is in heaven.

14. And as Moses lifted up the serpent in the wilderness, even so must the Son of man be lifted up:

15. That whosoever believeth may by him have eternal life.

16. For God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth on him should not perish, but have eternal life.

17. For God sent not his Son into the world to judge the world; but that the world should be saved through him.

18. He that believeth on him is not judged: he that believeth not hath been judged already, because he hath not believed on the name of the only begotten Son of God.

19. And this is the judgment, that the light is come into the world, and men loved the darkness rather than the light, for their works were evil.

20. For every one that doeth ill hateth the light, and cometh not to the light, lest his works should be $\frac{\text{set forth.}}{\text{reproved.}}$

21. But he that doeth the truth cometh to the light, that his works may be made manifest, that they have been wrought $\frac{\text{by}}{\text{in}}$ God.

JOHN III. 1-21.

1 Ἦν δὲ ἄνθρωπος ἐκ τῶν Φαρισαίων, Νικόδημος ὄνομα αὐτῷ, ἄρχων τῶν Ἰουδαίων· 2 οὗτος ἦλθε πρὸς αὐτὸν νυκτός, καὶ εἶπεν αὐτῷ, Ῥαββί, οἴδαμεν ὅτι ἀπὸ Θεοῦ ἐλήλυθας διδάσκαλος· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ταῦτα τὰ σημεῖα δύναται ποιεῖν ἃ σὺ ποιεῖς, ἐὰν μὴ ᾖ ὁ Θεὸς μετ' αὐτοῦ. 3 ἀπεκρίθη ὁ Ἰησοῦς καὶ εἶπεν αὐτῷ, Ἀμὴν ἀμὴν λέγω σοι, ἐὰν μή τις γεννηθῇ ἄνωθεν, οὐ δύναται ἰδεῖν τὴν βασιλείαν τοῦ Θεοῦ. 4 λέγει πρὸς αὐτὸν ὁ Νικόδημος, Πῶς δύναται ἄνθρωπος γεννηθῆναι γέρων ὤν; μὴ δύναται εἰς τὴν κοιλίαν τῆς μητρὸς αὐτοῦ δεύτερον εἰσελθεῖν καὶ γεννηθῆναι; 5 ἀπεκρίθη ὁ Ἰησοῦς, Ἀμὴν ἀμὴν λέγω σοι, ἐὰν μή τις γεννηθῇ ἐξ ὕδατος καὶ Πνεύματος, οὐ δύναται εἰσελθεῖν εἰς τὴν βασιλείαν τοῦ Θεοῦ. 6 τὸ γεγεννημένον ἐκ τῆς σαρκὸς σάρξ ἐστι, καὶ τὸ γεγεννημένον ἐκ τοῦ Πνεύματος πνεῦμά ἐστι. 7 μὴ θαυμάσῃς ὅτι εἶπόν σοι, Δεῖ ὑμᾶς γεννηθῆναι ἄνωθεν. 8 τὸ πνεῦμα ὅπου θέλει πνεῖ, καὶ τὴν φωνὴν αὐτοῦ ἀκούεις, ἀλλ' οὐκ οἶδας πόθεν ἔρχεται καὶ ποῦ ὑπάγει· οὕτως ἐστὶ πᾶς ὁ γεγεννημένος ἐκ τοῦ Πνεύματος. 9 ἀπεκρίθη Νικόδημος καὶ εἶπεν αὐτῷ, Πῶς δύναται ταῦτα γενέσθαι; 10 ἀπεκρίθη ὁ Ἰησοῦς καὶ εἶπεν αὐτῷ, Σὺ εἶ ὁ διδάσκαλος τοῦ Ἰσραήλ, καὶ ταῦτα οὐ γινώσκεις; 11 ἀμὴν ἀμὴν λέγω σοι, ὅτι ὃ οἴδαμεν λαλοῦμεν, καὶ ὃ ἑωράκαμεν μαρτυροῦμεν· καὶ τὴν μαρτυρίαν ἡμῶν οὐ λαμβάνετε. 12 εἰ τὰ ἐπίγεια εἶπον ὑμῖν, καὶ οὐ πιστεύετε, πῶς, ἐὰν εἴπω ὑμῖν τὰ ἐπουράνια, πιστεύσετε; 13 καὶ οὐδεὶς ἀναβέβηκεν εἰς τὸν οὐρανόν, εἰ μὴ ὁ ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καταβάς, ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ὁ ὢν ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ. 14 καὶ καθὼς Μωσῆς ὕψωσε τὸν ὄφιν ἐν τῇ ἐρήμῳ, οὕτως ὑψωθῆναι δεῖ τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου· 15 ἵνα πᾶς ὁ πιστεύων ἐν αὐτῷ ἔχῃ ζωὴν αἰώνιον.

16 Οὕτω γὰρ ἠγάπησεν ὁ Θεὸς τὸν κόσμον, ὥστε τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ τὸν μονογενῆ ἔδωκεν, ἵνα πᾶς ὁ πιστεύων εἰς αὐτὸν μὴ ἀπόληται, ἀλλ' ἔχῃ ζωὴν αἰώνιον. 17 οὐ γὰρ ἀπέστειλεν ὁ Θεὸς τὸν υἱὸν εἰς τὸν κόσμον, ἵνα κρίνῃ τὸν κόσμον, ἀλλ' ἵνα σωθῇ ὁ κόσμος δι' αὐτοῦ. 18 ὁ πιστεύων εἰς αὐτὸν οὐ κρίνεται· ὁ μὴ πιστεύων ἤδη κέκριται, ὅτι μὴ πεπίστευκεν εἰς τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ μονογενοῦς υἱοῦ τοῦ Θεοῦ.

19 αὕτη δέ ἐστιν ἡ κρίσις, ὅτι τὸ φῶς ἐλήλυθεν εἰς τὸν κόσμον, καὶ ἠγάπησαν οἱ ἄνθρωποι μᾶλλον τὸ σκότος ἢ τὸ φῶς· ἦν γὰρ πονηρὰ αὐτῶν τὰ ἔργα. 20 πᾶς γὰρ ὁ φαῦλα πράσσων μισεῖ τὸ φῶς, καὶ οὐκ ἔρχεται πρὸς τὸ φῶς, ἵνα μὴ ἐλεγχθῇ τὰ ἔργα αὐτοῦ· 21 ὁ δὲ ποιῶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἔρχεται πρὸς τὸ φῶς, ἵνα φανερωθῇ αὐτοῦ τὰ ἔργα, ὅτι ἐν Θεῷ ἐστιν εἰργασμένα.

v. 3. γεννηθῇ] ἀναγεννηθῇ, Old Latin, Egyptian Sahidic.

v. 5. τοῦ Θεοῦ] τῶν οὐρανῶν, ℵ* 472 al. pauc., Old Latin e m; Justin, Docetae Eus. Clem.-Hom. Tert. Orig. lat.

v. 8. Πνεύματος] ὕδατος καὶ τοῦ Πνεύματος, ℵ, Old Latin, Old Syriac Ambst.

v. 13. ὁ ὢν ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ, om. ℵ, BL 083 086 33 Egyptian Sahidic and some Bohairic codices, Ethiopic Diat. Apollin. Cyr., and perhaps others.

1. ἄνθρωπος = τὶς, as in i. 6, iii. 3. ἄρχων, a member of the Sanhedrim (vii. 26, 48, 50; Luke xxiv. 20; Acts iii. 17). 2. νυκτός is explained in xix. 38, "for fear of the Jews." In St. John's Gospel belief in Jesus involves excommunication from the synagogue (ix. 22, xii. 42, xvi. 2). τὰ σημεῖα prove to Nicodemus that Jesus is a teacher inspired by God. In the Old and New Testament God authenticates men by miracles worked through them (Matt. xii. 38; Mark xvi. 20; Luke xxiii. 8). The traditional Mohammedan teaching is that one genuine miracle is sufficient to prove the prophetic character of him who performs it (Klein, *The Religion of Islam*, pp. 74-76). 3. ἄνωθεν means (*a*) "from the beginning onwards" (Luke i. 3), and so "again," as in Gal. iv. 9, where it is used with πάλιν; v. 4 shows that Nicodemus thus understands it; (*b*) "from above" (xix. 23), hence its special meaning "from heaven" or "from God." That the author uses it primarily in this sense is clear from v. 5, where the phrase is repeated, but ἐξ ὕδατος καὶ Πνεύματος is substituted for ἄνωθεν; and from v. 31, where the two phrases ὁ ἄνωθεν ἐρχόμενος and ὁ ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ἐρχόμενος explain one another (*cf.* Jas. i. 17, iii. 15, 17). Throughout the Gospel St. John makes use of words and phrases which can bear two and sometimes three meanings (*cf.* ii. 19, iv. 10, vi. 51, xi. 50, xxi. 3). 7. μὴ with the aorist subject expresses a warning against the beginning of an action: "Do not begin to wonder." 8. πνεῦμα means here both "wind" and "Spirit." ἔρχεσθαι and ὑπάγειν are used in the Gospel for the "coming" of Jesus from the Father, and for His "return" whence He came (*cf.* vi. 14, vii. 27, xi. 27, xii. 13; vii. 33, viii. 21, xiii. 36, xiv. 4, xvi. 1); with πόθεν and ποῦ they express the mystery connected with the "coming" and "going" of Jesus (viii. 14, xiv. 5). ἔρχεσθαι is also used of the "coming" of the Spirit after the Resurrection, which is also a coming of Jesus Himself (xiv. 16-18, xvi. 7, 13). 11, 12. σοι . . . λαμβάνετε . . . ὑμῖν; the author changes from the singular to the plural, and Nicodemus passes out of sight, no further reference being made to him again except in vii. 20, xix. 39. μαρτυροῦμεν . . . μαρτυρία, the witness to the truth, upon which Christian experience rests, that Jesus was the manifestation of the glory of God. The words of the Baptist, the crowds, the woman of Samaria, the beloved disciple and the "we" of the Fourth Gospel, the words and miracles of Jesus, the Spirit, even the Father Himself, are all shown to bear witness. οἴδαμεν, λαλοῦμεν, ἑωράκαμεν, μαρτυροῦμεν . . . εἶπον; the interchange of "we," "I," is not limited to the last two verses of the Gospel. It is implied in the relation between the "we" of i. 14 (*cf.* 1 John i. 1-3) and the beloved disciple, who has seen, and whose witness is true. In this passage a close relation is supposed between the subject of εἶπον and Jesus Himself; the speaker carries on the words of Jesus without a break, and we are meant to understand that it is the

beloved disciple speaking, who lay on the breast of Jesus, and was, therefore, in the closest spiritual contact with Him. It is probably correct to suppose that the author meant his readers to understand the Apostles to be the "we" of the Gospel. 13. Christian experience leads to insight into heavenly things, because the Son of man not only came down from heaven, but is now in heaven; those who cannot understand rebirth, which takes place clearly and obviously on earth, and is the beginning of Christian life, will not understand the deeper mysteries, to which new birth initiates them, *cf.* Heb. vi. 1-6, where it is pointed out that, because the Christians have been baptized, they must go on to perfection (τελειότης). 14, 15. The parallel with the raising of the serpent lies in the connection between ὑψοῦσθαι and σωτηρία. In the Gospel ὑψοῦσθαι is connected both with the Crucifixion and with the Glorification which followed the lifting up on the cross (viii. 28, xii. 32 f.); but that it primarily refers to the Death is shown by the comment in xii. 33: "This He said signifying by what manner of death He should die." St. John preserves the traditional connection between "the Son of man" and the death on the cross. 15. Since the author does not use ἐν with πιστεύειν, ἐν αὐτῷ must be taken with ἔχῃ. The sentence ends with the important words ζωὴν αἰώνιον. 16. ἔδωκε, not only "gave" to the world, but implies παρέδωκεν εἰς θάνατον for the salvation of the world. ὥστε, consecutive with the indicative, only occurs in the New Testament here and in Gal. ii. 13; in classical Greek it is a normal construction. For the contrast between ἀπόλλυσθαι and σώζεσθαι, *cf.* 2 Cor. ii. 15. 17. κρίνειν, κρίσις, implies (*a*) Separation, (*b*) Judgment. This separation and judgment follows naturally as men believe or disbelieve in the name of the only begotten Son of God. But the object of the coming of the Son is not primarily judgment, but salvation. The judgment in the present does not exclude the final judgment (v. 28, xii. 48). 18. μη with the indicative is strange; contrast 1 John v. 10. Here it is probably due to assimilation to ὁ μη πιστεύων which precedes it. 19. μᾶλλον = "potius," not "magis." 20. The meaning of ἐλέγχειν is (*a*) to set out in order an inventory, (*b*) to reprove, (*c*) to put to shame; here it is a parallel word to φανεροῦν. 21. ποιεῖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν, belief and knowledge of the truth lead to action (*cf.* 1 John i. 6).

Interpretation.

The mystery of purification underlies the first four chapters of St. John's Gospel. The water changed into wine by Jesus was, as St. John expressly states, water used for Jewish purification, ii. 6; John the Baptist baptizes with water, i. 25, and the fact that Jesus also was baptizing leads to a discussion about purification, iv. 22 ff.; the episode of the Samaritan woman takes place by a well, and the subject of the discourse is water and eternal life; the cleansing of the temple is most easily explained as the coming of the Lord suddenly to His temple in order to purify it, and is inserted by the author at the opening of the gospel, because it illustrates purification as mediated by Jesus. Thus St. John contrasts baptism by Jesus, firstly, with baptism by John the Baptist, and secondly, with Jewish ceremonies of purification; and he shows that the water

coming from Jesus brings with it nothing less than eternal life—that is to say, purification through Jesus is fundamentally effective.

Closely connected with passages referring to this true purification occur references to the death of Jesus. The Baptist himself points to the Lamb of God which taketh away the sin of the world, and the account of the Crucifixion in the Fourth Gospel makes it quite clear that the Passover Lamb is meant—that is, the Lamb slain. The same connection between purification and the Crucifixion is seen in the answer to the question of the Jews after the cleansing of the temple: "What sign showest thou unto us, seeing that thou doest these things?" Jesus answered and said unto them, "Destroy this temple, and in three days I will raise it up." That is explained by St. John as meaning that the true temple and the purified and effective worship will appear after the Crucifixion, and, we may add, because of it. If there can be shown to be in the Fourth Gospel a close connection between the death on the cross and purification, then the miracle at Cana also suggests this; water-wine suggests water-blood, and it is further illustrated by the Water and Blood which flow forth from the pierced side of Jesus. The Crucifixion is for St. John the Hour, and this whole conception of Salvation and Life is dominated by the death on the cross. Thus, when Mary tells Jesus at the marriage feast that they have no wine, He answers that He cannot supply their need until the Hour has come. The true purification and the true drink can only be given to men after the Crucifixion. In the same way, when the Samaritan woman asks about worship at Jerusalem and Gerizim, she is told of the true worship, the Hour of which is coming, and may even be said to exist now, because the hour of the Death is at hand.

A clear sequence of experience and thought thus lies behind the early chapters of St. John's Gospel; the Crucifixion is considered fundamentally as the complete sacrifice, from which proceeds the new Israel which is born from God; those who share in this new birth and new creation are purified and possess eternal life; water and wine-blood being not only symbols of the new life, but rather means by which this life is generated and maintained. Since this is Christian experience, St. John illustrates it and explains it by picking up and redescribing various incidents recorded in the traditional accounts of the Lord's life, presumably well known to his readers, and contrasts it with that of the Jews and of the followers of John the Baptist. So true and real is the contact with God thus attained, that denial of it involves a clear and immediate judgment upon the unbelievers, and what exists for their salvation leads, in fact, to their condemnation.

Firmly embedded in these chapters is the account of the interview with Nicodemus. St. John uses this incident to show what

claims Christianity has upon educated Jews, who were attracted by the new religion, but feared excommunication from the synagogue, and to impress upon Christians the real meaning of their baptism.

Nicodemus, impressed by the miracles of Jesus, draws the deduction that he is a "teacher from God," and that God is "with him," and thereby shows that he does not understand what Christianity is. The true position of the Lord can only be understood by those who have experienced the new birth, which is nothing less than birth "of Spirit" and "from above," and is both to see and to enter into the kingdom of God. This radical change is effected by water—that is, by the dramatic act of Baptism. Christians are therefore twice born, once at their natural birth in which they become "flesh," and again at their baptism, in which they receive the Spirit and become sons of God—children of the new Israel. The Jews cannot understand this, though their position as teachers of religion ought to have given them an insight into this fundamental religious experience of new birth effected by a dramatic action; their denial of this experience of the coming of the Spirit involves a serious judgment upon the Jews. As a matter of fact, Christians, not only are reborn, but they know whence the Spirit comes and whither He goes. But the Jews, neither recognizing nor experiencing the birth from the Spirit, which is an earthly experience, cannot understand the things in the heavens, and so they use inadequate phrases about Jesus, saying that he is a teacher, and that God is with him. The truth is that He, the Son of man, not only came from heaven, but now is in heaven; so that He was and is with the Father, rather than the Father with him; and therefore Christians, who have the Spirit from heaven, know whence He comes and whither He goes. He comes from Jesus, and He goes to Jesus, who is in heaven. But until or unless the Jews are reborn in baptism they will not understand this, for this is quite literally a heavenly knowledge. This experience of rebirth and the heavenly knowledge which results from such rebirth is a direct result of the life, and especially of the death, of Jesus. He is the only begotten Son of God, and God gave Him for the salvation of the world, because God loves the world. Men share in this salvation as they gain insight into the real meaning of the coming of Jesus; he who believes can appropriate salvation. This implies the inevitable corollary that those who, like the Jews, see in Him nothing more than a man from Nazareth, whose father and mother they know, or even a teacher come from God, cannot appropriate the salvation, and are therefore already being judged. If a man cannot see the glory of the Father manifested in and through Jesus he is blind, and neither believes nor knows nor sees. It is this vision or lack of vision which separates the true from the false, and is the real judgment.

The ultimate cause of blindness is immorality, for those whose deeds are evil dare not come to the light.

Such a paraphrase makes it quite clear that the same sequence of thought lies behind the narrative as is implied in the first four chapters as a whole. Christianity is an experience of real contact with God, which can only be described as a new birth, involving, as it does, purification and a new life, which is eternal because the new birth is from God. This experience has been mediated by a great act of initiation, and Christian baptism is fundamentally important, because it has in experience mediated the new birth. But Christianity is not only an experience, it is also Truth, because Jesus is the manifestation of God Himself, and Christian experience is purification by God and union with Him.

Such an interpretation of this passage in the Fourth Gospel raises inevitably the question of the relation of primitive Christianity to the contemporary mystery religions. Eternal life, mediated by a dramatic act of initiation and closely connected with a divine person who suffered death, not to mention the ideas of rebirth and the "coming to the light," present obvious points of contact with the mystery religions; and many scholars have, therefore, explained the Christianity which lies behind the writings of St. Paul and St. John as being due to the fusion of the primitive Gospel with the mystery religions of the Roman Empire. But such a supposition would seem to be unnecessary, if once it be granted that Christian experience after the Crucifixion was the fact which moulded Christian thought and practice, and that this experience was mediated by what we should now call sacramental means, and was, in some vital way, connected with the life and especially with the death of Jesus. This would appear to be the witness of the New Testament writers themselves. Thus, the fact that Christianity shows close parallels with the mystery religions need not involve that it is dependent upon them, but rather that both answer a fundamental demand of human nature, and the real question for the second and third centuries was, whether the Truth lay with Christianity or with some form of religious syncretism.

E. C. Hoskyns.

MISCELLANEA

NOTES AND COMMENTS

The first Anglo-Catholic Congress marked an historic moment in the life of English Christianity, for it revealed explicitly several only half-suspected facts. It showed first, for example, that the public had ceased to be afraid of religious ceremony as such; the old fear that all such things were "Roman" is evidently dead. Again, the remarkably cordial reviews of the Congress published by such representative organs as the *Record*, the *British Weekly*, and (through its special correspondent) the *Universe*, clearly indicate an extensive process of regrouping of spiritual elements and forces. Most important of all was what it revealed to the Church itself. What had once been a party had now become a worldwide movement. The fact that the meetings were presided over by bishops from every quarter of the world, and that complete unanimity between them and their audiences was observable in their witness to Catholic faith, discipline, and devotion, gave to the Congress a rare strength and range. Great truths were rediscovered in a great experience; the sense of isolation was gone, and the unity of the "one Lord, one faith, one baptism, one God and Father of all" was attested by the manifest unity of the one Spirit informing the one Body.

The Congress declared its mind unequivocally in certain directions; and it may be well to enumerate the points which commanded its immediate assent. They will obviously be the live issues of the next few years:

1. The integrity of Catholic Faith and Order.
2. The Christian law of sexual purity and of indissoluble marriage.
3. The disestablishment of the Church.
4. An embargo on the early marriage of clergy.
5. The claim of Missions.

We cannot doubt the substantial affinity of such a platform with the mind of the Church of the early centuries.

Some of the most striking papers were those read by younger members of the University of Cambridge. The theological quarterly which appeared under the title of *Comment and Criticism* in 1913 was the work of this school, and was making strong headway, when the war claimed other services from its personnel. But the movement has continued to develop; the Oratory of the Good Shepherd has opened an Oratory House as a centre of devotion and pastoral work; while the review published in this number from the pen of Mr. R. H. Thouless, who holds the Burney Studentship in the Philosophy of Religion and is Caldwell Research Student at Corpus Christi College, well represents the philosophical principles of this group.

Readers of Rudolf Eucken will remember the high store which he sets upon the religious life in its reaction upon the moral life of society as a whole; and we are glad to call attention to the *Directory of Religious Communities of Men and Women*, compiled for, and issued by, the Faith Press (2s. net). This handbook contains precise and scheduled information as to the various religious communities and deaconess institutions known to exist in our Communion, and will go far to meet the needs of inquirers. In his Introduction the editor draws attention to the serious fact that the Church of England at present takes no corporate cognizance of the religious state, and provides none of the safeguards which authoriza-

tion would ensure. It is surely time that this anachronism ceased; and we trust that, when the Lambeth Conference is discussing the Ministry of Women, opportunity may be taken to set this form of ministry upon a more recognized footing.

In *Missions Overseas* (Twelfth Review, 1920)* the Central Board of Missions issue an inspiring chronicle of the Church's progress in distant lands, including the Colonies. Detailed statistics of population and religious allegiance, of European and native clergy, and of Missionary Societies; tables showing the growth of the Episcopate in all parts of the world; a series of excellent maps showing diocesan boundaries; and concise reports of progress and set-backs, problems and open doors—these are all contained in its 120 pages. They make on our mind the same kind of impression as the immortal chapter in which Thucydides portrays the swaying fortunes of the battle at Syracuse—no mean tribute to a volume so largely statistical as this.

In *Documents Bearing on the Problem of Christian Unity and Fellowship, 1916-1920* (S.P.C.K., 2s. net) we have a useful summary of the resolutions, manifestos, and proposed concordats to which this cause has given rise. With many of them we are familiar from the daily press; but it is safe to say that the most important are those which are least widely known, coming as they do from America, from India, and from East Africa. Of these the first two seem to us by far the most important, as they reveal a grasp of general principles which we miss in the last. In India representatives of our own Communion and of the South India United Church propose practical steps towards reunion on an episcopal basis; and the Mar Thoma Syrian Church, speaking through unofficial but weighty representatives, expresses general concurrence. In America a concordat prepared by members of our own Communion and of Congregational Churches has been embodied in a proposed Canon, and will be considered by the General Convention of the Episcopal Church in 1922. One notes a marked difference between the methods suggested in South India and in America. While in India the period of transition to episcopacy is to be marked by a recognition of ministers of the S.I.U.C. "without reordination" as a "condition" of reunion; in the United States the "ordination" of Congregationalist ministers who desire wider authorization for their ministry is immediately contemplated. Without "giving up or denying his membership or his ministry in the Communion to which be belongs," such a minister would have added to it through episcopal ordination the larger and more representative commission.

This whole concordat breathes a spirit of large-hearted and outspoken conviction, and betrays a lucid grasp of principle, which makes it a refreshing contribution to the reunion movement. Two facts seem to us unquestionable: first, that the ministry of the Free Churches is a real ministry; secondly, that it is not the priesthood of the Church Universal. The concordat faces both facts and prepares the way for integration.

We believe that one further development will be needed in the concordat, if it is to result in a union which will be truly fruitful—viz., the common use of some kind of liturgy. Nothing so expresses, and so cements, a union of hearts in one Spirit as common forms of Eucharistic worship. We do not mean that the existing liturgy of the Episcopal Church should be accepted by the Congregationalists, but that they should consent to adopt a Communion Office which conformed in all the essentials of structure to accepted models.

* S.P.C.K., 2s. 6d. net.

We have to acknowledge the courtesy of the Oxford University Press in permitting the reprint of extracts from Dr. Souter's text of the New Testament in Mr. Hoskyns's *Adversaria Exegetica*, of which we publish the first to-day. Mr. Hoskyns's article in the *Journal of Theological Studies* for April of this year indicated a new line of approach to the study of St. John, and one which may take us far.

We are glad to draw attention to the two new quarterlies—*Biblica* and *Gregorianum*—which emanate respectively from the Biblical Institute and the Gregorian University at Rome. Both began publication in January of this year; and they testify to the wealth and accuracy of learning to be found in the Roman Communion. The article designated below contains a masterly exposition of the Antiochene principles of exegesis, to which the name of Θεωρία was given; and the modernity of this school, which insisted that all prophecy had an immediate historical, as well as a Messianic, reference, is abundantly illustrated. The writer quotes Julian of Eclanum's definition—*Theoria est autem, ut eruditis placuit, in brevibus plerumque aut formis aut causis earum rerum quae potiores sunt considerata perceptio*—and makes out a strong case for identifying the *eruditi* with the Antiochenes.

RECENT ARTICLES OF INTEREST*

1. Philosophical.

"Questions Preliminary to Critical Reconstruction in Theology" (Dr. F. R. Tennant). *Constructive Quarterly*, March, 1920.

"Christianity and the Supernatural" (Baron F. von Hügel). *Modern Churchman*, June, 1920.

2. Biblical and Doctrinal.

"Genesis i.-iii. and St. John's Gospel" (E. C. Hoskyns). *Journal of Theological Studies*, April, 1920.

"La Θεωρία nella scuola esegetica di Antiochia" (A. Vaccari). *Biblica*, January, 1920.

"Il concetto della Sapienza nell' Antico Testamento" (A. Vaccari). *Gregorianum*, April, 1920.

"Christian Doctrine in the Fourth Century according to Theodore of Mopsuestia" (Dr. A. Mingana). *Bulletin of John Rylands Library*, April to November, 1919.

"Jesus the Workman" (Prof. F. Granger). *Expositor*, June, 1920.

3. Comparative Religion.

"Dragons and Rain Gods" (G. Elliott Smith, F.R.S.). *Bulletin of John Rylands Library*, April to November, 1919.

"Primitive Art and Magic" (Dr. H. J. D. Astley). *Hibbert Journal*, April, 1920.

"The Miracle of the Wine at Dionysos' Advent" (J. Vürtheim). *Classical Quarterly*, April, 1920.

"The Musical Heritage of India, i." (H. A. Popley). *International Review of Missions*, April, 1920.

* A brief record of matter in recent periodicals which, by virtue of its positive contribution to knowledge and thought, or its bearing upon subjects treated of in Theology, may be of use to our readers.

"IN THE SPIRIT"

Dominus Illuminatio.

PSALM xliii. 4.

GLADNESS of soul is characteristic of the Saints. It is gladness in God. Its source is the heart of Divine love itself. The Saint loves God for Himself alone and not because of any generosity in His giving. He preserves his gladness in God no matter how he is afflicted. His gladness in God indicates the degree of his spiritual perfection. But because this holy gladness is not common it deserves to be well considered. In what does it consist? How can it be attained? It consists in the knowledge of God by love. Union with God in the highest degree is effected by love. The higher the degree of union the more does the soul find in God satisfaction, yea, the very completeness of its own life. It finds that without which it would not even live consistently with its own nature. It finds love which, revealing the Divine perfections, satisfies every spiritual desire. And more, to love is to possess, and the soul possessing God in love is glad. We attain to this gladness in God through persevering love, through deep self-giving to God. Love's giving is the measure of its gladness. It gives only to find itself rewarded by a love more generous than itself. It is made conscious of a love which inspires while it rewards and gladdens while it receives. And so love by this mutual action effects the union and makes glad the soul of the Saint. When we begin to be glad in spirit in the unspeakable joy of realized love we know that never more can we be glad in anything else. This Divine love delights the soul in so many ways that there is no limit to our seeking, or to our experience of it, and therefore no limit to the gladness. Saintly examples of holy gladness are themselves revelations of Divine love to be received with gratitude for the encouragement they afford to the humble and lowly who in their degree yet truly love.

X.

The Word in Action.

Loyalty to the King.

"Thou shall grant the king a long life: that his years may endure throughout all generations."—PSALM lxi. 6.

It is objected by some to-day that the Book of Common Prayer has a royalist or feudal bias, that the Established Church, indeed, cannot be expected officially to speak otherwise. At the same time it is observed that leaders of public opinion, intent upon the social righteousness to which that Established Church has seemed indifferent too long, do not shrink from words of disloyalty to the reigning house; although in point of fact such disloyalty has been apt to disappear under the spell of personal contact with the Sovereign, from the days of Richard II. and Wat Tyler down to the night of the Armistice in 1918. However that may be, no attempt to define, defend, or attack the social witness of the Church should be made without first mastering the National Mission Committee's Report entitled "Christianity and Industrial Problems." Even the direct appeal to the Jesus of history yields less conclusive results than are often claimed, in this as in other spheres of debate. "What think ye of Christ?" Patriot? Social reformer? Mystic? Scientist? Or, to put the question less dangerously, what do the Gospels show as mattering most to God incarnate? The independence and exclusiveness of the "holy nation"? Their righteousness, at any rate as between oppressor and

oppressed, teacher and disciple, among those who had all been bondmen alike once upon a time? Or was the Gospel a message of denationalization to include all true piety and all intelligent compassion?

To do them justice, Socialists (according to Peabody in *Jesus Christ and the Social Question*) do not base their protest upon His teaching: just as many conscientious objectors were professedly non-Christian, felt themselves labelled against their will, and justified their protest rather by reason than by conscience. But the hard sayings of Jesus Christ about the rich and His denunciation of formal religion are so often quoted by irresponsible fault-finders that it is worth while remembering how He refused to be tricked into any expression disloyal to Cæsar (although the political charge had to be trumped up for the proceedings before Pilate) and that the Pharisees were if anything the popular party (in contrast, *e.g.*, with the Herodians or Court party). Christ was a patriot both by birth (David's son) and in sympathy—"O Jerusalem, Jerusalem" (Matt. xxiii. 37); "Daughters of Jerusalem" (Luke xxiii. 28). [Readers of *By an Unknown Disciple* will recall the drawing of Judas as the disappointed patriot and humanitarian.] It is mercifully impossible to tie the Saviour of the World down to any system, or claim His sanction for anarchy either. But that does not mean that there were no political entanglements or threats of social upheaval in His day.

We have begun with the doings of Peter: let us now make use of his words written in the light of experience. Refer 1 Pet. ii. 13-17, and devise counsel thereby. Thus,

1. "Honour all men." Mere humanity (or the likeness of God) carries with it a claim to consideration. Cultivate patience in dispute, approaching every opponent as though one man were always as good as another, and every question as though there must be two sides to it. See the patience of trainers and farm labourers with animals! Why should men extend less to fellow-men?

2. "Love the brotherhood." This is something beyond mere respect for man as man (2 Pet. i. 7), two stages beyond that patience and one short of perfection. Does the League of Nations come in here?

3. "Fear God." 4. "Honour the King." Surely the good man is the good citizen? The Non-Jurors still loved England; but, alas! James had fled without releasing them from their oath.

It is surely not improper, in these days of constitutional monarchy, to tell Englishmen that loyalty to the King means loyalty to constitutional methods. These methods are threatened from industrial quarters. Therefore the Church is concerned with industrial unrest, to this extent, at any rate, that the causes of industrial unrest are ultimately psychological. [Perhaps read W. W. Crotch, *Industrial Anarchy and the Way Out.*] Let the Christian beware of falling from faith into arrogance and pretending that they are psychological entirely, as though sociological and financial experts had nothing to give to reconstruction. But if he is continually prepared to give those experts their due, they will be grateful for the Christian impact, to make the wheels—new wheels, perhaps—go round.

August brings memories of the turning-point of a great deliverance, when Britain prayed and unexpectedly the tide of invasion turned. This year another tide bids fair to sweep us, British and French, off our feet. May loyal prayers once more avail, when human counsel seems exhausted, to stem or divert it from us!

Y.

PSALM lxxx., 17-end.

DISCUSSION

CHRIST'S TEACHING ON DIVORCE. A sermon preached by the Ven. R. H. Charles, D.D., Archdeacon of Westminster. Printed in the *Guardian*, June 25.

This sermon has already produced much discussion, and will be even more widely read when it appears in pamphlet form. It is a thoughtful and learned pronouncement of which the Bishops will no doubt take full account in their deliberations at the Lambeth Conference. Its thesis is shortly this: The Jewish punishment for adultery, as laid down in Deut. xxii. 22, was death both for the man and the woman, the form of death not being specified. This law was in force till A.D. 30, when all power of capital punishment was taken away from the Jews by the Romans* (Jerus. Talm. Sanh. 18*a*, Babyl. T. 41*a*); it was therefore in force during our Lord's ministry, and for one or more years after its close. He said nothing to abrogate it, and never mentioned it at all. His controversy with the Jewish authorities (Matt. xix. 3-9; Mark x. 2-12) and His words in the Sermon on the Mount (Matt. v. 31), were concerned with Deut. xxiv. 1, 2—*i.e.*, with divorce for causes other than the wife's adultery. In this case He maintained that divorce was sinful and marriage indissoluble. "Christ, by accepting the Jewish law relating to the adulterous wife and confining His own enactments to less grievous offenders, allows the right of divorce on the ground of adultery as well as subsequent remarriage on the part of the guiltless person concerned, but forbids divorce on any lesser ground, as well as the remarriage of those divorced on any such lesser ground."

Many will be grateful to Dr. Charles for his outspoken words on the positive side of his plea. "Marriage is indissoluble save on the ground of adultery." And the remarriage of the divorcer (apart from divorce for adultery) Christ declares to be adultery. If any laws are passed by the civil government which give the slightest loophole for such a divorce on any grounds except adultery, and for remarriage following such a divorce, they will be explicitly anti-Christian. There is no need to labour that fact. It is surprising that some newspapers could so misinterpret the sermon that the Archbishop of Canterbury found it necessary to explain to the House of Lords Dr. Charles's attitude on that point.

But the negative side of his argument invites criticism. He says that it is "a fact of significance" that the Deuteronomic law of death was in force when our Lord spoke. That assumes it to be certain that our Lord spoke before A.D. 30, and even one or more years before it. But he gives no hint that the date of the ministry

* When the power was taken away, the punishment for adultery was compulsory divorce (Sotah vi. 1).

is doubtful. There is a great deal to be said for the view that the Crucifixion must be dated as late as A.D. 36. (This was suggested by Dr. Kirsopp Lake, in *Expositor*, Nov., 1912, and his arguments are summarized by the present writer in *St. Matthew*, p. 211 f.) If it is correct, the whole of the ministry was later than the loss of the power of capital punishment by the Jews. In John xviii. 31 the loss of it is actually mentioned, and the synoptists agree in relating that the Jews, having condemned Jesus to death, were obliged to hand Him over to Pilate.

In support of his view that our Lord accepted the Jewish law of death, the Archdeacon cites the story in John viii. 1-11 of the woman taken in adultery. It was certainly not originally part of the Fourth Gospel, but "no great scholar or critic entertains any doubt as to this section being a genuine piece of history, and the record of a real incident in the life of our Lord." That is rather sweeping. But if the passage is genuine history, is it quite adequate to say, "Our Lord's answer shows that He did not question the validity of this law, but that He objected to the jury or judges before Him"? The words "He that is without sin among you" do not seem to me to be directed only against those present as jury or judges. He was deprecating in all men the self-complacent attitude which condemns the sin of one tempted human being regardless of one's own sins. It is analogous to "Why beholdest thou the mote that is in thy brother's eye?" etc. We can imagine Him putting it thus: "Ye have heard that it hath been said to them of old time, Thou shalt put an adulteress to death. But I say unto you, Have regard to your own sins before you mercilessly condemn another's." It has not necessarily any bearing on His attitude to the Jewish law of death then in force—if it was in force.

Moreover, it cannot be safe to assume that He approved of every Jewish law to which we have no record that He objected. Dr. Charles says: "Had our Lord regarded this law as invalid, we know from analogous passages in the Sermon on the Mount that He would have made His standpoint clear with regard to it. Thus in the Sermon on the Mount we find, 'It was said to them of old time, Thou shalt not kill . . . but I say unto you.' Again, 'It was said, Thou shalt not commit adultery, but I say unto you.' His attitude to any Jewish law that He objected to* shows no sign of accommodation or opportunism. This comes out clearly alike in what He said regarding the Sabbath and things clean and unclean." This argument from silence is very precarious, but it is crucial to Dr. Charles's position.

Even the story itself, supposing it to be historical, does not compel

* Our Lord in no sense objected to, or regarded as invalid, the laws "Thou shalt not kill," and "Thou shalt not commit adultery." That cannot be Dr. Charles's meaning, though his wording suggests that it is.

us to think that the capital punishment for adultery was then in force. In Sanh. xi. 2 it is laid down that the punishment for adultery is strangling. This is a purely academic interpretation belonging to a time after all power of inflicting such a punishment had been taken away, and based on the fiction that the Deuteronomic law was still binding. Our Lord's questioners similarly affected to disregard the Roman authority, and tried to obtain from Him, for purposes of their own, an academic pronouncement, which He declined to give.

We are thus left with the synoptic accounts of His teaching in Matt. v. 31 f., xix. 9; Mark x. 11 f.; Luke xvi. 18, which contain four statements: (1) A man who divorces his wife [except for fornication (Matt.)] and marries another commits adultery (Matt. xix.; Mark, Luke). (2) A woman who divorces her husband and marries another commits adultery* (Mark). (3) A man who marries a divorced woman commits adultery (Matt. v., Luke). (4) A man who divorces his wife [apart from fornication] causes her to commit adultery (Matt. v.). Dr. Charles agrees that the words in square brackets are glosses, but maintains that they are correct glosses, introduced simply to remind the reader that the passage is concerned only with divorce for grounds other than adultery. The Mosaic law under discussion is that in Deut. xxiv. 1, 2 and the question put to our Lord in Matt. xix. was to obtain a reply from Him which would commit Him to agreement with either the Hillelite or the Shammaite school, the former contending that a man had the absolute right to divorce his wife *for any reason*, the latter interpreting the expression " some unseemly thing " in Dt. *l.c.* in a strict sense of some actual indecency.

This is the strongest part of his argument. I cannot feel quite sure that the glosses were not for the purpose of noting the practice of the Christian Church of allowing divorce for adultery, the glossator failing to see that the context had no reference to adultery. But that is a minor point. Dr. Charles is perfectly correct in saying that Deut. xxiv. 1, 2 is not concerned with divorce for adultery, since xxii. 22 has already enjoined death for adultery, and that the question of the Pharisees had reference to the former and not to the latter.

We are therefore left in the following position: Our Lord *never expressed a definite opinion* that has come down to us on (*a*) divorce for adultery,† or (*b*) the remarriage of the divorcer, or (*c*) the remarriage

* This is not necessarily an " inconsequential absurdity " introduced by St. Mark. Herodias had recently deserted her husband Philip and been married to Antipas. Our Lord perhaps takes the opportunity of condemning a pagan practice which under Jewish law was impossible.

† It is curious that Dr. Charles should say that Christ " allows the right of divorce on the ground of adultery as well as subsequent remarriage on the part of the guiltless person concerned." *Ex hypothesi*, He allowed only death as its punishment, and the guiltless survivor could of course marry again.

of a divorced adulteress; but only on divorce for causes less than adultery, which He condemns absolutely.

Now, whether (as some think) Jesus consciously taught an *interim-ethik* or not, He did not legislate in detail for coming ages. What He did time after time was deliberately to go behind and above the details of tradition and controversy, and to throw a bright light upon ultimate Divine principles. And the Church, with her authority to bind and to loose, must apply the principles to the growing complexities of society in such a way as to adhere in single-hearted loyalty to the *spirit* of her Master. The principle which He brought into clear light is that the sexual relationship of man and woman was consecrated at their first creation; man and wife are to become " one flesh " by marriage in an indissoluble unity.*

And however true it may be that His questioners had in mind only divorce for causes less than adultery, and that His reply as addressed to them was a reply on that subject, yet the full content of the principle is not exhausted. The principle—the ideal of marriage as sacred and indissoluble—cannot be confined to the case of divorce for causes other than adultery; because it is a fundamental, moral, Divine principle, it embraces every aspect of the sex problem. And the *spirit* of His reply is that to which His Church must be true. With regard to (*a*), a divorce for adultery, she has decided from the first that that is an unavoidable limitation, to which He would have assented, of the perfect ideal. With regard to (*c*), the marriage of a divorced adulteress (or adulterer), she has decided that to agree to it would be to violate the ideal with a gross defiance that is unthinkable. If after divorce for lesser causes the remarriage of the divorced is declared by Christ to be adultery, *a fortiori* it is abhorrent from the Divine ideal after divorce for adultery.

There remains (*b*), the remarriage of the guiltless person who has divorced the other for adultery. What the Church has to make up her mind about is not whether it may not be the wisest policy to meet the popular desire for divorce facilities half-way, but whether a single-hearted loyalty to the *spirit* of Him who said, " What God hath joined together let not man put asunder," allows her to make any further limitations of the ideal than that of divorce for adultery which she has sanctioned from the first. Whatever conclusion she may come to, the purpose of this paper is to point out that it is unsafe for her to try to reach it by a scholastic deduction from our Lord's silence on the subject.

A. H. McNeile.

* Again, not as Dr. Charles puts it, " a unity which could not be broken by anything save adultery." On his own showing, our Lord in His argument does not so much as mention divorce for adultery.

REVIEWS

THEOLOGY AS AN EMPIRICAL SCIENCE. By D. C. Macintosh, Ph.D. Allen and Unwin, Ltd. 1920. 12s. 6d. net.

The title of this book is one which will make it attractive to the many who are sincere practising Christians, but are distrustful of conventional theology and of any kind of metaphysics. They will open it, not to find out what Dr. Macintosh can tell them about God, but what guidance he can give them in their search for a scientific method in theology. It is from the point of view of such readers that this review will be written. We will ask whether it succeeds or fails as an essay in empirical method in theology, not whether it is of value as a philosophy of religion or as a devotional treatment of religious questions. By thus limiting the scope of our criticisms we may be led to condemn what from another point of view might be found valuable. A sufficient justification for this method of proceeding seems to be provided by the bold claim to empiricism made by the title, and by the fact that this question of bringing theology near to experience is one which is felt on many sides to be of the first importance.

Dr. Macintosh puts forward three problems as the crucial ones for a scientific theology. They are the following: "(1) Is there *religious perception*, or something in the religious realm corresponding to perception, viz., cognition of the Divine as revealed within the field of human experience? (2) Is it possible to formulate, on this basis of the data made available in religious experience, *theological laws*, or generalizations as to what the Divine Being does on the fulfilment of certain discoverable conditions? (3) Can *theological theory* be constructed in a scientific manner on the basis of these laws?" (p. 26).

A science must start with a formal definition, though that definition may develop as the science proceeds. Therefore Dr. Macintosh starts with a formal definition of God, as the ultimate Object of religious dependence, or the Source of religious deliverance. On the basis of knowledge of God through religious experience, the empirical theologian posits the existence of God, though he may have as yet very little knowledge as to what God is.

In a later chapter of the book Dr. Macintosh makes it clear that he starts with the subjective certainty of the existence of God which is given by religious experience. This is subsequently verified by the test of a more methodical empirical investigation. It is not quite clear what this means. Empirical investigation can only reach the experiences themselves, it cannot reach to the reality behind these experiences. We would prefer to say that the presupposition of

the existence of God is verified by the power of this postulate to rationalize wide ranges of experience. This is how a scientific presupposition is verified. The atomic theory of Dalton was postulated on the very slight basis of the laws connecting the volume of a gas with its pressure. That theory has been justified by its power of explaining an enormous range of facts completely unknown to its originator.

This is an important point. If we recognize that an empirical justification of our hypotheses can be obtained in this way, we are provided with an empirical method in theology which may be expected to be more fruitful of results than any narrowly inductive procedure.

The author seems to undervalue the difficulty of justifying his theism on the grounds of religious experience. He says: "There is no more reason, from the point of view of religious experience, to adopt an agnostic or subjectivist interpretation of the Object of religious experience than there is, from the point of view of sense-experience, to adopt an agnostic or subjectivist interpretation of the objects of sense-perception" (p. 32). But this does not do justice to the agnostic. There are obvious differences between the cases of religious experience and sense-perception. The latter is universal and independent of one's belief in the existence of its objects; the former is individual, and is in some measure dependent upon belief. Moreover, theology needs to postulate the existence of its object, in a way that is not necessary for physical science. A man may, on philosophical grounds, believe in the unreality of matter, and yet be a successful physicist or mechanic; he cannot worship a God in whose existence he does not believe.

We believe that the existence of God can be made a valid inference from religious experience, but the problem is not so simple as the passage quoted above would lead us to suppose. It would seem to be particularly desirable that a book claiming to be scientific should not be content with this treatment of a point of such importance.

For the formulation of its laws, science depends on the principle of the uniformity of nature; so the author would find for empirical theology a corresponding principle, which he calls the dependableness of God. "God can be depended upon to act consistently so that man may learn through observation and experiment what God does under different conditions" (p. 35).

It is important to notice exactly what this principle involves. The scientific principle of the uniformity of nature is nothing more than the statement that the phenomena of nature can be summed up in general laws. The principle of the dependableness of God as Dr. Macintosh states it is nothing more than the statement that the

facts of theology can be summed up in similar general laws. It is an affirmative answer to the second of the three problems proposed in the passage previously quoted. The only possible reason for now giving this answer is that Dr. Macintosh has been successful in summing up theology in general laws. This is attempted later in the book but not, we think, successfully.

The remainder of the discussion of the scientific method in theology is not of much importance. It is principally Mill's treatment of induction—a treatment not altogether adequate as an account of the method of physical science. Science has shown herself curiously inclined to develop by her own methods without bothering overmuch about the rules for her guidance laid down by theoretical logicians. The applicability of such methods when applied to theology must be judged by examining Dr. Macintosh's attempt to apply them. It is at least possible that, like physics, Theology develops most happily when left to the methods natural to her, and not when forced into the groove which is natural, let us say, to physical science.

Before looking at the "laws of empirical theology" it will be interesting to examine Dr. Macintosh's treatment of one particular theological problem. We may take as example the well-worn question of miracles with special reference to the miraculous birth of Our Lord.

In consideration of the unsatisfactory nature of the evidence for this event—its omission from the Pauline and Johannine literature, from Mark and the "Q" material of Matthew and Luke, etc.—and of the fact that there is no scientific evidence of parthenogenesis except among lowly organized animals, he concludes that we are warranted in "assuming the improbability of the Virgin Birth of Jesus, or of any other religious leader" (p. 54). Other miracles in the New Testament can also be accounted for in a fairly plausible way without departing from known laws. Those which cannot are rejected as legendary accretions.

All of this has been said before many times. It may be true that Jesus was born as other men are, and that the miracles recorded in the New Testament are mistaken reports of natural events. But these things do not follow from the author's position; they are not the results of treating theology as an empirical science. They are the product of two presuppositions which the author shares with most liberal theologians but which he does not state as presuppositions of his theology. These appear to be: (1) that miracles have never happened; (2) that the personality of Jesus differed only in degree from that of any other religious leader. While admitting that liberal theologians may be right on these points, we must also insist that they are not necessities of thought, they are not admitted by the vast

majority of Christians (including many of intellectual eminence); and therefore that to smuggle them in as if they were necessary presuppositions of any scientific theology is a proceeding against which we must protest.

Any discussion of these questions cannot be adequate without taking into consideration the fact that if the principle of the dependableness of God leads us to believe that under the same circumstances He will act in the same way, it is also highly probable that under different circumstances He will behave in different ways. If, as most Christians believe, the birth of Jesus was a unique event, the incarnation of God, then we can say nothing of the conditions under which it might be expected to take place. On the same assumption (of the divinity of Jesus) we would be quite powerless from data supplied by ordinary human life to make any inductions which we could be certain would apply to the life of God Incarnate. These considerations do not prove the truth of any particular miracle, or, indeed, of any miracle, but they do show the weakness of any *a priori* rejection of miracle or of the Virgin Birth on pseudo-scientific grounds.

The author's formulation of the "laws of empirical theology" will, naturally, be felt to be the most important part of the book. It is here that the reader will expect to find a theology with real content and universal validity. He will be disappointed. He will find no more than a statement of Dr. Macintosh's own religious opinions, showing no signs of that dependence on empirical data which is the essential characteristic of a law of empirical science.

These laws are as follows:

The laws of elemental volitional experiences—"On condition of the right religious adjustment with reference to desired truly moral states of the will (such as repentance, moral aspiration, and the moral elements in self-control, courage, victory over temptation, faithful service and patient endurance), God the Holy Spirit produces the specific moral results desired" (p. 148).

The theological law of regeneration—"On condition of the right religious adjustment with a view to being turned permanently from sin and to God and the Christian way of life, God the Holy Spirit works primarily in the will, and ultimately in the nature more generally, the definite and manifest beginning of a new and specifically Christian spiritual life" (p. 149).

The law of perseverance—"On condition of the persistence of the right religious adjustment, God the Holy Spirit maintains in the individual the new and essentially Christian life" (p. 149).

The law of the health of the Christian life—"On condition of a sufficiently whole-hearted cultivation of the right religious adjustment, God the Holy Spirit so brings our action and experience under

the Divine control that we are enabled to do what we ought to do, and to have, subject to the conditions of the environment and of our constitution and past history, the normal accompaniment of emotional and intellectual experience" (p. 149).

The law of the development of essentially Christian character—" On condition of continuance of the right religious adjustment, especially when it is so constant and whole-hearted as to lead to the permanent health and healthful activity of the Christian life, and when the individual has adequate information for right conduct, God the Holy Spirit produces in him the Christ-like or Christian character, with its habitual readiness and equipment for right action " (p. 150).

These are called the primary theological laws, because they are concerned with the volitional religious experiences which are the most immediate results of the right religious adjustment. There are also secondary theological laws which are so called because they are partly dependent on the above experiences.

They are the following:

The theological law of the feeling of repentance—" On condition of (1) volitional repentance and (2) a sufficiently steady and continued contemplation of the contrast between one's own past life and action on the one hand, and the ideal principle of life, such as receives particular expression in the historic Jesus, on the other, God the Holy Spirit produces (as the accompaniment of intensified volitional repentance) the feeling of sorrow for sin " (p. 150).

The theological law of the experience of Christian peace—" On condition of (1) the reconciliation or atonement with God which is involved in a truly Christian faith and (2) a steady contemplation of the fact that one is at peace with God, there is produced within the individual by God the Holy Spirit, within such limits as may be set by constitutional and other conditions, a feeling of peace " (p. 151).

The theological law of Christian joy—" On condition of (1) success in the Christian life and in Christian work for others through the right religious adjustment, and (2) a contemplation of this success, especially in the lives of others, God the Holy Spirit produces the experience of Christian joy " (p. 151).

The theological law of Christian love—" On condition of right thought and action toward God and man, God the Holy Spirit produces in us (' sheds abroad in our hearts ') the feeling of unselfish love toward God and man " (p. 152).

There are also other secondary theological laws which we will not give in detail. These are the *intellectual* laws of the experiences of " Divine guidance " and of " assurance "; and the *physiological* laws, such as that of mental healing.

There remain still the *social* laws. These are of two kinds: *ecclesiastical* and *general.*

The former resemble the laws already given, only differing in the substitution of the church for the individual—" meaning by ' church ' the community unified on the basis of vital religious experience shared in common " (p. 155).

The laws of the Divine guidance of the Church and of the assurance of being a true Church are sufficiently important to be worth quoting in full. The former is: " On condition of such a cultivation of the right religious adjustment in the church-meeting that the individual members are brought by the Holy Spirit into a Christian state of willingness to do what is eternally right and for the greatest good of mankind, they will in this way have been brought by the Divine Spirit, other conditions being equal, into the best possible frame of mind for coming to a correct decision as to what they ought to do " (p. 155). The law of ecclesiastical assurance is that " when a Church, through persisting as a Church in the right religious adjustment, is brought by the Holy Spirit into the normal Christian condition of health and efficiency, it will tend to be sufficiently assured that it is essentially Christian in character, or, in other words, that it is one of the true churches of God, or of Jesus Christ " (p. 156).

The general laws are those formulating the data of the " leavening influence " of the " kingdom of God " in the world. These Dr. Macintosh does not attempt to formulate, but he is hopeful that something in that direction may be possible.

It would be difficult, I think, for the most ardent admirer of the scientific method to feel that this list of laws carries us very far. They seem to be merely psychological laws with the addition of two elements which are not supplied empirically: the fact that the sole determining condition of the operation is an adjustment of the person concerned, and that the operator is God the Holy Spirit. The first of these elements would seem to be in glaring contradiction to much empirical evidence. Deep and lasting religious experience is often accompanied by no obvious favourable adjustment of the subject (as, for example, in conversions); and, on empirical grounds, there would seem to be no reason to refuse to admit the rite as a determining condition.

The derivation of the laws of the religious community from the laws of the individual, with no other change than the substitution of the word " church " for " individual," would, moreover, seem to be open to very grave objection. Even if it were valid this substitution could not be admitted without proof, for it begs one of the most important practical questions for empirical theology—the question of the church. Its validity, however, would seem to be more than questionable, for few things are more clear from history than that

the religious community has occupied, with respect to revelation, a totally different position from the individual. It is, of course, arguable that all Churches have tended to have a less valuable experience than the individual, but it seems more consistent with facts to suppose that the experience of the body is nearer the truth than that of individuals. In any case it seems certain that the laws in the two cases are not the same.

The third part of the book is called " theological theory." Here Dr. Macintosh discusses such questions as: " The Relation of God to the Universe," " The Metaphysical Attributes of God," and " The Problem of Evil." Like the rest of the book, these chapters are as thoughtful and sincere as must be any work written by a man of Dr. Macintosh's philosophical ability. As an attempt at an empirical theology, however, they seem to be extremely unsatisfactory. While always referring to his conception of scientific method in theology, the author does not depend on its data or laws to any greater extent than any other writer on the philosophy of religion. The real value of much of this discussion is due to Dr. Macintosh's piety and insight, not to his loyalty to the empirical method.

The impression left by this book is of the sterility of the empirical method as Dr. Macintosh understands it. Is this sterility a necessary result of the application of empiricism to theology ? There seems to be no reason for supposing that it is. An entirely different method of approaching the problem is possible, that adopted, for instance, by Mr. Will. Spens in his *Belief and Practice*. Instead of trying to build up a new theology from first principles, we may begin by asking whether there is not a theology which has from the first (like the body of scientific knowledge) been built up in closest contact with experience. Such a theology is to be found in traditional Christianity. We cannot accept it in full, any more than we can accept the body of scientific knowledge possessed by the scientists of even a hundred years ago. It must be corrected by our own wider experience. We find part of it expressed in terms of inadequate conceptions supplied by an antiquated metaphysic. Nevertheless, it provides us with a starting-point, rich with the fruits of a wider experience than can be known to any system that we originate for ourselves, a starting-point from which we may reasonably hope to construct an empirical theology that is truly scientific.

R. H. Thouless.

Erasmus and Luther: Their Attitude to Toleration. By the Rev. R. H. Murray, Litt.D. London: S.P.C.K. 1920. 25s. net.

One of the outstanding weaknesses of the Church at present is her lack of good ecclesiastical historians; and for that reason, no

less than for its own magnificent merit, we welcome this book. It marks the public advent of a scholar and thinker worthy of the best English tradition, of one indeed from whom we may expect such positive contribution to our peace as is brought always by those who seek out truth by knowledge.

Since manner is so important to matter, it were well to begin by a glance at Dr. Murray's workmanship and historical methods. They are interesting and individual. His subject is the well-worn, yet inexhaustible one of the continental Reformation; but his handling of it is new. There are strikingly few books in English which deal seriously with it; and they with one consent have set themselves to relate its confused external course, its tangled and dull political reactions. Dr. Murray tells the tale of the two great minds from which, in different ways, it sprang; of the progress of their thought, and its bearing on all modern history. Throughout, therefore, the book is a history of thought rather than of action, and thereby not only achieves a unity, a simple directness of thread, which in itself is a triumph, but also gives to every page a living application to-day. Dr. Murray doubtless despaired of dealing adequately with the thought of the Reformation if he had also to detail its action; and so he rightly subordinates the latter, and works it in by allusion. It makes the book perhaps a little hard for those who are not well acquainted with the progress of events, but gives it unique and permanent value.

The tale of these two minds is told directly, year by year, from their writings, public and private. But the appeal to original sources is not confined to the writings of Erasmus and Luther; the bibliographies, which begin and end the volume, are vast; but still more remarkable is the apparently effortless and inevitable way in which the thought and writings of everybody else are wrought into a single fabric. It was an age of crisis and of great men; scholarship and thought were still cosmopolitan, yet in every nation the national genius was finding pronounced individual expression. So around Luther and Erasmus centred the history of the whole world.

Style unites with scope to make the book easy in the reading, though nobody dare read it fast. There is no careless writing; Dr. Murray employs most of the devices of style which vary and lighten; and chisels each. His own merits are disclosed by a series of epigrammatic comparisons. Here is a part of one such passage:

"In spite of this measure of agreement, how could the exact scholar approve of the brutality of language of the reformer? His comprehension of the past, especially the past of antiquity, was as wide as his knowledge of it. To Erasmus, moreover, there were shades and degrees, but to Luther there were none. The former will cite the Fathers; the latter, himself. Erasmus will study the

Fathers in order to understand the Bible; Luther, like Lefèvre d'Étaples, will believe in his own inspiration. Erasmus would have agreed far more closely than Luther with Lessing that the search for truth was of more value than truth. The one was essentially a teacher: the other was no less essentially a prophet. Luther was aglow with enthusiasm, alive with faith, eloquent in speech, dreaming dreams and seeing visions. Luther had the greater heart, while the coldness of the cloister clung to Erasmus. Erasmus had the greater brain. . . . Erasmus was the mouthpiece of what most men were thinking, and Luther, like Rousseau, was the voice of what others were feeling. The one was a calm philosopher, the other a fiery fanatic. Evolution was the way of Erasmus; revolution proved the way of Luther. The binding tie with the past inspires the one; it makes no appeal to the other. To Erasmus there was no weapon equal to persuasion. At the end of the Directory that man of thought, the Abbé Sieyès, feeling his powerlessness, exclaimed, "I need a sword," a need Erasmus never experienced. His breadth was his weakness at the time, but his strength with the generations to come. The narrowness of Luther was his strength at the time, but his weakness with the generations to come. He possessed that robust dogmatism, that strong conviction, which is utterly alien to the temperament of a scholar. . . . The history of Erasmus is the history of a mind; the history of Luther is the history of a man. Religious progress is for the one clearness: for the other it is enrichment. The one believes in a revelation perfect and complete; the other believes in a revelation slow and gradual. The light Luther derived from the sacred record must be absolutely pellucid. The summer haze that surrounds all great thought was not for him."

These verdicts are scarcely new; in so conspicuous a period how can they be? But their expression is always cogent, often brilliant. And they sum up, be it remembered, a fair and exhaustive examination of the documents, which are freely quoted, and introduced with such skill that they add to the movement of the paragraphs in which they occur, instead of calling a series of tiresome halts.

The author widens the scope of the subject in hand in two ways, both unusual, and both persistent. First, by constant reference to the other novelties and influences begotten by the early sixteenth century. We hear as much of Cortes and Magellan and Regiomontanus as of Clement VII. and Philip of Hesse. In this way Dr. Murray pulls his study of toleration out of a merely ecclesiastical setting, and combines all the impacts of event on to the march of human thought along his chosen road. His second habit works to the same end in a subtler manner. He assumes the relation of his heroes to future ages by comparing them and their work with the great figures of later history. Lessing, Rousseau and the Abbé

Sieyès make their bow in the quotation above; but some of the parallels are more elaborately drawn out—of Erasmus and Burke. for instance; of Luther and Bismarck. The method has its dangers, The scholar suspects the amount of generalization it involves, and less learned readers are apt at times to get bewildered. But it usually illuminates, and is a brave habit, and a big.

So much for the manner of the book. The matter ultimately concentrates on the thesis indicated by the sub-title, "Their Attitude to Toleration." To Dr. Murray, the greater understanding, and the slow, gradual establishment, of Christian toleration is the thread which binds in a unity all the chaos of post-Reformation Church history. Not that the process is complete or even in view of completion. But until the problems of toleration are solved, the new and lovelier undivided Catholic Church of our dreams cannot begin to rise from sure foundations. This conception lends life and greatness to the book, but also declares it to be no more than volume one. The work of Erasmus and Luther was decisive, in the field of toleration, because it originated. Erasmus lives still as a decisive influence in the world of thought. Luther is dead, but once worked decisively in the world of action. So this is a history of beginnings. We look forward to a second volume—which will pivot, no doubt, on Calvin, with Loyola and Castellio on the right and left—to a third and a fourth. Then, perhaps, we shall be able for the first time to disentangle the meaning of post-Reformation Church history from those national, local, denominational, sectarian manifestations which alone we can see, and which begin to sicken us in the seeing.

And so Dr. Murray's thesis bears directly on our deeper problems to-day. We labour, more insistently, more consciously, than ever, over the questions of authority and freedom. Where is the seat of the one, the limits of the other? Good history always helps us to see with clearer eye, and to judge with saner mind. And although Dr. Murray nowhere betrays personal preference, and judges his two heroes with critical impartiality, no one can dispute his verdict that Luther is past history, and Erasmus a forceful influence. The inspired prophet may for a generation and more obscure the calm thinker and overturn the world, but the balanced wisdom and truth of the latter prevail down the long ages.

Erasmus lives. And particularly he lives in the England which he loved. For Erasmus was a Catholic, and the chosen champion of Catholicism, before, under the generalship of Rome, it bound intolerance to itself as a weapon of war. After Trent he could not have existed in the Western Church of the Continent; before Trent, he was its ideal representative. Now this is a tremendous fact. For "Erasmian Catholicism" is a noble and recognizable type, truly Western, truly Catholic, full, rich, lovely, and essentially tolerant;

nearer, perhaps, to men's vague yet definite ideal of Christianity than any other which has found representation in a living Communion. Whither, then, has it gone, with its loyalty to the past, its tolerance in the present, its reaching forward unto the truth of a greater future? With Erasmus, and the Church which looked up to him, before our eyes, it can never be said that there is only one possible form of Western Catholicism, the Roman. Roman or Tridentine Catholicism embodies another influence, the ideals of Caraffa and Loyola, the intolerants. Historically and actually this is beyond question; the whole Christian world, Catholic and Protestant, knows it, whether to glory in it or to resist.

Its strength is indeed in its existence, a strong existence. But the Erasmian Catholicism, we may claim, exists no less than the Tridentine. It awoke after an uneasy slumber in England last century. It is rapidly arriving at self-consciousness now. Anglicanism is a genuine and living form of Western Catholicism, Erasmian not Caraffan. The essential gulf, perhaps the only one, between Roman and English Catholicism is the gulf between the intolerant and the tolerant principles at their hearts. The principle of intolerance at its heart, if tracked down, accounts for everything about Rome which can fairly offend the world's Christian conscience; the working out in Catholicism of the Erasmian ideal of toleration, if honestly examined, explains everything in Canterbury which renders it halting, hesitating, many-voiced, and un-self-confident as a religious system.

This is but one obvious application of Dr. Murray's patient, just, and brilliant scholarship. There are many others, for the book begets suggestion in every chapter. We only hope that he may make its continuance his life-work. It is hardly worth while pointing out minor errors in a volume so careful in its indices and references; the footnote on p. 350 about Egranus, however, had better have been printed at the earlier mention of him on p. 342.

E. Milner-White.

NOTICES

BIBLICAL STUDIES.

1. Christ's Perpetual Intercession. By W. J. Sparrow Simpson, D.D. S.P.C.K. London, 1920. Pp. 14. 4d.
2. The Testimony of Josephus to Jesus Christ. By William Emery Barnes, D.D. S.P.C.K. London, 1920. Pp. 22. 4d.
3. Moses the Founder of Preventive Medicine. By Percival Wood, M.R.C.S., L.R.C.P., Capt. R.A.M.C. S.P.C.K. London, 1920. Pp. xii.+116. 4s.
4. The First Easter Morning: A Suggested Harmony of the Gospel Narratives. By N. P. Williams. S.P.C.K. London, 1920. Pp. 91. 3s. 6d.
5. Three Lectures on the Epistle to the Ephesians. By H. L. Goudge, D.D. S.P.C.K. London, 1920. Pp. 84. 3s. 6d.

These books belong to a new series of " Biblical Studies " which the S.P.C.K. are publishing. To judge from the present volumes, the series will cover a very large field; for the term " Biblical " is given a wide connotation when it includes Josephus.

The first pamphlet is a short study of the doctrine of Christ's perpetual intercession as taught in the Epistle to the Hebrews. Certain difficulties in the conception are discussed, and in its deepest meaning it is found to be an extension of the Atonement, " the continual spirit of reparation presented before the Father." This doctrine is usually treated as part of the doctrine of the Atonement, and it may be doubted whether in its essence it is really so much neglected as Dr. Sparrow Simpson seems to imagine. The practical application, at least, which he draws from it is a fundamental part of the presentation of Christianity put forward by most ex-Chaplains, not to mention many other teachers.

The second pamphlet consists of a discussion of the genuineness of the well-known passage in the works of Josephus containing the " testimony " to Jesus. This has commonly been supposed to be an interpolation by an early Christian scribe. Professor Barnes, however, will not allow the case to go by default, and argues strongly against this view. As might be expected of him, he does it in a very scholarly way. He carefully examines the language of the passage, and insists that it is too vague and non-committal—indeed, too non-Christian—to be the work of a Christian, but that it is just what one might expect from an historian like Josephus. Here, too, he finds an explanation of the much-advertised silence of Origen. Such a " testimony " would be of little value in the first Christian centuries; it has only come to be of importance owing to the Christ-myth theory of Drews and his fellows. The pamphlet is a useful one, and puts the case for the genuineness of the passage clearly and forcibly.

Captain Wood finds in Moses a genius far in advance of his time. Indeed, if the medical profession had only studied the Pentateuch, many modern methods of hygiene might have been put into practice long ago. But unfortunately Moses had to " gild the pill," and in his days this took the form of casting a religious glamour round the most matter-of-fact precautions. In the course of time the Jews fell away from the spirit of the Law, and developed only its purely ceremonial side; thus the underlying medical rationale was lost. The book is an interesting one, chiefly as showing the spread of saner views about the nature of the contents of the Bible. But it may be doubted whether the system of taboo does not

explain at least as many of these primitive Jewish laws as the medical theory.

The First Easter Morning is an attempt to meet the difficulties due to the discrepancies between the stories in the different Gospels of the events of the first Easter morning. The older harmonies struggled to combine all the Gospels in one narrative, while refusing to admit any error on the part of any of the Evangelists. This new harmony, by admitting a confusion here and an error there, does supply a consistent account without putting too great a strain on the reader's credulity. Certainly, Mr. Williams has done his work very skilfully, and his reconstruction of the events may be in the main true to the facts. It at least proves that it is possible on this method to draw up a narrative of what happened which possesses verisimilitude, and this was worth showing. Such reconstructions, however, must remain conjectural, and their effect will always be largely subjective.

We have kept the best of these books to the last. Canon Goudge's lectures on the Epistle to the Ephesians are of real value, for they are extremely suggestive, and open up lines of study in many directions. Canon Goudge has already written of the mind of St. Paul, and he here sets out, not to discover St. Paul's mind by his epistle, but to interpret his epistle by his mind. "St. Paul was an orthodox Hebrew of the first century, who had been converted to Catholic Christianity. We shall need to remember both his old outlook and his new if we wish to understand his words." On these lines a general exposition of the thought of the epistle is worked out, and it is done with delightful freshness and acumen. The lectures were originally given to the clergy of the diocese of Wakefield, and various practical applications are made from St. Paul's methods to the work, especially the teaching work, of the clergy at the present day. Those who are able might well study the book alongside of Dr. Armitage Robinson's commentary on the epistle—no small compliment to pay this study. Our chief complaint against it is that it does not contain an index, which would have added considerably to its usefulness. But the book has a value far in excess of its size, and may be strongly recommended.

G. A. Chase.

Westminster Commentaries: The Book of the Prophet Jeremiah, with Introduction and Notes. By L. Elliott Binns. Methuen.

At the present day when the value of the teaching of the Old Testament is being constantly called in question, a work which brings Old Testament characters and standards into relation with the complexities and problems of modern life and thought will commend itself to all seekers after God. Not the least valuable feature of Mr. Binn's commentary on Jeremiah is the stress he lays on the importance of the study of the Old Testament as illustrating and interpreting the New Testament. He insists that it is "from His dealings with the souls of men—both collectively and as individuals—that God is to be known most certainly." To Jeremiah God above all was a moral Being demanding justice and holiness in all His worshippers. The prophet's problem was how, in the face of the failure of the official exponents of the national religion, to bring men into communion with God. Driven back on God by his pathetic isolation, he came to see the necessity of communion between the individual man and God. The Old Covenant made with the nation had, through the sin of the nation, failed to bring men to righteousness; a New Covenant must be inaugurated. The prophet's message from God was that "grace, not law, is the founda-

tion of fellowship." God would write His law in their hearts, and all should know Him from the least even unto the greatest. Mr. Binns has explained why it was that this astounding advance of Jeremiah in religious thought and experience came to be neglected by later Judaism, its importance in the development of Christian thought, and how the promises of the New Covenant found their fulfilment in the Gospel.

Mr. Binns does not seem to have made up his mind as to Jeremiah's attitude towards ritual and sacrifices. In his Introduction he asserts that the prophet "goes so far as to deny the Divine origin of the temple sacrificial system"; while in his note on vii. 22, he writes: "He was not denying the cherished belief of the people that the sacrificial system was of Divine origin." His exposition of the verse is marked by an interesting suggestion. He proposes to render the Hebrew: "I spoke not unto your fathers nor commanded them in the day that I brought them out of the land of Egypt *for the sake of* or *on account of* burnt offerings," in place of the R.V. "concerning burnt offerings." Jeremiah, he thinks, laid stress on the reality underlying sacrifice rather than on the actual sacrifices. "God wanted the hearts of His people, not their offerings." The prophet objected to sacrifice when it cloaked wrongdoing and ignorance of the moral law, and was substituted for the obligation to live a godly life.

Mr. Binns has wisely refused to be drawn from his subject to treat of the influence of Jeremiah on the Book of Job and the Psalms. In regard to Deuteronomy he has not been so reticent. In opposition to the majority of modern scholars we find him contending that the date of Deuteronomy is later than Jeremiah. He does not accept Driver's explanation of vii. 22, referred to above, that "the priestly parts of the Pentateuch had in all probability not yet been combined with the rest of the Pentateuch, and the reference here is to the latter." A statement of the grounds on which he rejects the more widely accepted theory of the dependence of the prophet on Deuteronomy would have added materially to the interest of the book.

In describing the social and economic conditions of the prophet's time Mr. Binns is illuminating. "The ancient simplicity of life, which had always marked the Judean peasantry and even the nobles, had almost entirely vanished before the influence of Assyrian customs; and society, as it became ever more complicated, became ever more corrupt. The breezy life of the Judean uplands had given place to the artificial atmosphere of an Oriental court; the eunuch had become more important than the shepherd; among the upper classes luxury had been substituted for manliness, and in the lower freedom had become pauperism." Social reform to Jeremiah meant a public recognition of God's moral claims—a truth which the world needs to-day. Under the figure of "the virgin daughter of my people" we are meant to see the prophet's appeal to the nation as a corporate whole. Jeremiah's influence on the exiles was all-important. The ruin of their life as an independent nation did not mean with the Jews, as with other peoples, that they lost their national God. The event had been foretold and its significance explained. The defeat and humiliation of Yahweh's people were not signs of His impotence to protect them, but rather vindicated His righteousness and moral government.

Readers will enjoy the many happy quotations with which this work abounds. Mr. Binns has not hesitated to press into his service masters of the literature of all times. His illustrations of popular beliefs and tergiversations are enlivened by a sense of humour; as, for instance, when he tells us that Luther regarded the Turks as instruments of God for the punishment of sinful Christendom, and deprecated resistance to their

victorious advance until their appearance before the walls of Vienna quickly changed his point of view. Or when he quotes the Talmudic legend that to dream of Jeremiah was a sign of coming misfortune !

It may be doubted whether Dr. Briggs' opinion that the Jews did not regard lying as wrong until they came under the influence of the Persians was worth quoting. There is a misprint in the R.V. text of p. 367, and in the Hebrew of p. 7.

This book fully merits its place in the series of Westminster Commentaries. Exegetical notes are prefixed to each chapter or division of the text, and the author's remarks in his additional notes are worthy of special attention. Mr. Binns has made an important contribution to biblical knowledge, and his book meets a long-felt need.

A. Guillaume.

An Introduction to Old Testament Study for Teachers and Students. By E. Basil Redlich, M.A. London: Macmillan. 1920. Pp. xviii + 280. 6s. net.

This book, by the director of Religious Education in the Diocese of Wakefield, is intended primarily for teachers in day schools, and it is well adapted to meet their needs; at the same time it forms a good elementary introduction to the critical study of the Old Testament for the general reader. Mr. Redlich begins rightly enough by a survey of the literature of the Hebrews; he then goes on to trace the gradual development of various ideas and institutions amongst them—*e.g.*, the Conception of God and the Place of Worship, Prophecy, Sacrifice and Priesthood, etc. In the chapters which are given to these subjects the author shows an adequate acquaintance with recent literature, and a sufficient grasp of it to make him a useful and stimulating guide to others. The tone of the book is didactic, there is an absence of all discussion of varying theories; this makes for clearness and ease of reading, but one feels that some qualifications might with advantage have been introduced. It has to be remembered that the study of the Old Testament is at present in a very unsettled state: the growing school which would put the greater part of Deuteronomy in the exilic period can no longer be ignored; there are also advanced scholars like Mr. S. A. Cook, whose articles in the latest edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica* are of a revolutionary character; the work of the conservatives, too, has perhaps more value in it than many have been willing to admit.

In the greater part of his book Mr. Redlich keeps very close to Driver and the central group of critics, but in the earlier sections of Chapter IX. he gives a view of the origins of the Hebrew people which is evidently derived from Dr. Burney's recent theories. Now these theories, especially in the cautious and qualified shape in which Dr. Burney has himself stated them, are of great interest to scholars, and may well be accepted after further examination; but they certainly ought not to have been put forward in an elementary manual as the sole account of the early history of the chosen people. Mr. Redlich's book as a whole is admirably done, but this single lapse gives it for the scholar a touch of "amateurishness" of which it would otherwise have been entirely free.

Further provision for the needs of teachers is made by the inclusion of a number of specimen Questions and Answers, a Synopsis of Teaching, and Outline Lessons. There is also a Bibliography at the close which gives books for further study, compiled, one imagines, from those volumes which the author has himself found useful, and naturally by no means complete or exhaustive.

L. Elliott Binns.

ST. LUKE: THE MAN AND HIS WORK. By H. Maclachlan, M.A., B.D., Lecturer in Hellenistic Greek in the University of Manchester. Manchester: University Press. 1920. Longmans, Green and Co. 1 vol. Pp. xii + 324. 7s. 6d. net.

This book is the work of an enthusiast. Mr. Maclachlan does not disguise his desire to present St. Luke as worthy of the highest admiration, and that in many capacities. St. Luke as a Man of Letters, Linguist, Editor, Theologian, Humorist, Letter-writer, Reporter, Diarist, and Friend—such are, roughly, the titles of his first eight chapters.

The remaining four deal with special problems, and it is here perhaps especially that our author's second object (though frequently emerging in earlier chapters) becomes evident. He is almost as anxious to vindicate the "Western" text as to extol St. Luke. This text gives us, for example, the true key to the behaviour of Gallio, by showing that it was *the Greeks* who beat Sosthenes—an action which, Mr. Maclachlan thinks, even a conscientious governor might approve. Again, it is the Western text which enables Mr. Maclachlan to claim for St. Luke the interesting story of the man whom our Lord found at work on the Sabbath.

The most ambitious chapter in the book, however, is the last, which essays to prove that the incident of the woman taken in adultery should form part of the Gospel of St. Luke. Here our author has our cordial sympathy. For certainly any scholar, reading the story for the first time, and being asked (*a*) whether it were an authentic record, and (*b*) to what evangelist it belonged, would feel strongly disposed to regard it as highly characteristic of the most valuable part of St. Luke. Mr. Maclachlan shows that, besides the intrinsic resemblance of its subject-matter, the style also has many Lucan features. A special excursus deals with the peculiar condition of its text. The slender manuscript support for the story, and the still more slender attestation of its presence in the third Gospel, make it impossible to be confident; but our author may fairly claim to have strengthened the case for its inclusion in St. Luke

Another valuable chapter is that on St. Luke the Linguist, where there is a useful review of the reasons for believing that St. Luke had some knowledge of Semitic languages. Mr. Maclachlan, of course, accepts the Western *we* in Acts xi., from which it is inferred that St. Luke was indeed a native of Syrian Antioch. It would, therefore, be easy for him to acquire such knowledge. The question is one which may influence us, for example, in deciding whether St. Luke *composed* the Canticles in his first two chapters, and incline us in favour of the second of the two alternatives propounded by Harnack*—viz., free elaboration of oral tradition or translation of an Aramaic original. To us this latter explanation seems more convincing, for if St. Luke were the composer, why did he not compose a song for the aged Anna to match that of the aged Simeon?

The studies of the different aspects of St. Luke differ considerably in value. They are almost overburdened with quotations from scholars of all descriptions; but Mr. Maclachlan never fails to bring in a verdict in favour of his hero. An interesting essay on the humour of St. Luke stimulates the reader to add some further examples. Did St. Luke smile as he recorded the attitude of Gallio (for not even Mr. Maclachlan's explanation can prevent us from regarding him as a *Birrell togatus*)? Did he smile when he remembered how and why Eutychus fell asleep, since St. Paul was able to avert the tragic consequences of too long a sermon? He certainly appreciated the "official account" which the captain expected

* *Date of the Acts and the Synoptic Gospels*, p. 2.

Felix to swallow; Mr. Maclachlan thinks he actually composed it. But we must protest when Mr. Maclachlan ascribes to St. Luke the humour of some of our Lord's parables. What right have we to say "the parable of the Friend at midnight is doubtless based on some illustration used by Jesus, but in form entirely, and in substance partially, is the creation of Luke"? Others (*e.g.*, Canon Streeter and Dr. Glover) have pointed out the humour latent in many of the Master's sayings. It is *not* true—witness Ecclesiasticus and St. James—that the Hebrew race is devoid of humour. And the tendency to ascribe to St. Luke so much freedom in dealing with his sources is one of the most serious faults of Mr. Maclachlan's book. It is, however, very helpful and very readable (the more so as it is admirably printed and pleasantly light to handle), and no lover of St. Luke should be without it. Those who are specially interested in Hellenistic Greek will find frequent reference to the valuable illustrations afforded by the papyri.

R. M. Gwynn.

NATIONALITY AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

The Responsibilities of the League. By Eustace Percy. Hodder and Stoughton. 6s. net.

A Handbook to the League of Nations. By Sir Geoffrey Butler. Longmans. 5s. net.

Five years of war and their legacy of suspicion and weariness have brought home, even to the dullest and most limited imagination, the world's need of a more real unity and of a greater degree of co-operation. It is no longer thinkable that the nations should remain entirely unrelated, self-contained, or that there should be no means of enforcing upon national policies a sense of responsibility for the welfare of the whole. The doctrine of the Balance of Power being finally discredited, there remain two possible methods of advance towards the attainment of the desired co-operation. The alternatives before the Paris Conference are well stated by Lord Eustace Percy:

"There were two alternatives before them—either to create a half-legalist, half-militarist system of compulsory arbitration and international police armament, or to perpetuate in new soil, and so far as possible in a new atmosphere, the natural growth of international co-operation and consultation as represented in the Paris Conference itself. The first alternative was probably far the most popular and the most widely advertised, but its rejection was the greatest, perhaps the only great stroke of statesmanship achieved by British and American influence at Paris" (p. 196).

Whatever of cant there may have been in many war-time speeches about democracy and freedom, there was sufficient reality to make it impossible to repeat the crime of the Holy Alliance. Sir Geoffrey Butler points out that Canning's doctrine of "non-intervention," which he laid down as a protest against some of the activities of the Holy Alliance, is the true precedent for Article X. of the Covenant of the League of Nations, which implicitly declares that the League shall not interfere with the "internal" affairs of any of its members.

The chief value of Lord Eustace Percy's book is to be found in the emphasis that it lays upon the truth that the League sanctions and carries to its logical conclusion the doctrine of nationality formulated by Mazzini, the doctrine which inspired most of the nineteenth-century political reforms. If it is the obvious duty of the League to curb the selfishness

of individual nations, it is no less clearly committed "to the task of creating a better system, not by inventing a new and opposite doctrine, but by providing opportunities and means of co-operation." Because Nationality is accepted and acknowledged, the British and American guarantee to France is perfectly consistent with the idea of the League, whereas if the intention had been to create a super-State such a bargain would have been meaningless and contradictory.

As a necessary consequence of the refusal to attempt the erection of a super-national State, there was no desire among the framers of the Covenant to draw up a cast-iron system. Recognizing that the League is but machinery through which the will of sovereign States is to be carried into effect, they have throughout assumed the existence of life within, failing which the machinery is valueless. "We are not committed to things as they are, even to things as we have agreed they should be by our signature of the Peace of Versailles. On the contrary, we have recognized that that Peace can only be tolerable if it provides machinery for progressive change" (p. 25).

Whatever deeper forces have been at work, there is no doubt that the idea of the War to end War made a strong and wide impression on the public imagination, and it is the thought that the League of Nations may render impossible the repetition of the tragedy of 1914 that accounts for whatever there is of passion and of hope behind its inception. But, of course, the value of the League as a preventive of war depends almost entirely on its work in more normal times. Nowhere is this more clearly put than in the famous pamphlet by General Smuts, quoted by Sir G Butler:

"It is not sufficient for the League to be a sort of *Deus ex machina*, called in in very grave emergencies when the spectre of war appears; if it is to last it must be more. It must become part and parcel of the common international life of States; it must be an ever-visible, living, working organ of the polity of civilization. It must function so strongly in the ordinary peaceful intercourse of States that it becomes irresistible in their disputes; its peace activity must be the foundation and guarantee of its war power."

Of the two books under consideration, Lord Eustace Percy's, *The Responsibilities of the League*, is by far the more ambitious. The argument is at times obscure, and the connection between the various chapters difficult to follow, but it is throughout suggestive, and its main value is perhaps to be found in its constant return to the same theme from many different standpoints. Because the Nation is the unit in the new league, Bolshevism, which ignores nationality, is its supreme enemy. For the same reason the immense importance of our internal policy is underlined; and yet, again, while Lord Eustace seems to have the greatest trust and confidence in our civil servants, the "efficio-crats," as he calls them, he insists that the responsible representatives on the Council must be the Prime Ministers, or elected national chiefs. The value of the book is greatly lessened by its containing no copy of the Covenant of the League. Constant references to particular articles, and even to paragraphs of the Covenant, with no opportunity of reference, assumes a minuteness of knowledge which is probably not shared by more than a dozen people in the world.

Sir Geoffrey Butler's modest little book makes no such assumptions. It contains the Covenant in full, together with the official commentary; while his own Introduction and simple notes are extremely valuable to the elementary student of the subject. In his Preface he expresses the hope that his book may be found useful in educational circles, a hope which we most cordially endorse; a knowledge of the constitution of the

League should become not merely a necessary part of the political education of every citizen, but an essential part of the religious education of every Christian. The most ardent supporters of the League do not claim for it that it is more than machinery; the driving force must come, and can only come, from instructed Christian opinion, which can make of the League a real instrument for the promotion of the Kingdom of God on earth.

GEOFFREY GORDON.

DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE HISTORY OF THE CHURCH. Vol. I. to A.D. 313. Edited by B. J. Kidd, D.D. S.P.C.K. 7s. 6d. net.

By publishing translations of Christian literature the S.P.C.K. has done the Church a great service. There was a time when there was much to be said for the opinion that those who were capable of reading and understanding such literature could read it in the original tongue. It was an opinion which never fitted the facts, though it had a measure of truth, especially when the original in question was Latin. Practically all education beyond the "three R's" was based on Latin and Greek, and the more advanced the pupil the greater the knowledge of those languages.

All that is changed. In the first place education is no longer built up on a foundation of Greek and Latin. A large proportion of our most highly-educated men and women—such as mathematicians and experts in the many branches of science—have little Latin and less Greek. It is an affectation to assume that translations are only necessary for the stupid and ignorant. Moreover, education is no longer the monopoly of a few. It is the possession of the multitude. Without attempting any precise definition of the word "educated," one may venture to assert that there are now in this country millions of educated persons of both sexes, without a knowledge of Latin or Greek, eager to learn, ready to read, but apt to be impatient of drudgery, difficulty, or dulness in their reading. It is an age of books and discursive reading. Few will read books which weary them, unless for purposes of examination, and history, if it is to interest, must be vivid. Now the simplest way of making the past live is to let the writers and actors of the past, or the eyewitnesses of the things recorded, speak for themselves. Events seen through the medium of third persons seldom seem to live. Indeed, modern readers seem more impatient of second-hand narration than their fathers were. At any rate, they like to get back to the original documents, and if they are to do so the original documents must, in the vast majority of cases, be translated. The volume before us is not a history, but *a history-reader's companion.* It gives the translations of documents or extracts from documents, which are most important for their bearing on the history of the Christian Church down to A.D. 313. The compiler is Dr. B. J. Kidd, the Warden of Keble College. Each extract is numbered, is given a descriptive heading, a date, and references both to the original and to the translation. Nothing could be better arranged. A large number of people should find it most useful. The extracts have hitherto been embedded in a considerable literature for the most part inaccessible to the average man or woman. The volume contains extracts from Plato, Demosthenes, Pliny, Tacitus, Apuleius, Suetonius, Lucian, Dio Cassius, the Passion of the XLIX Martyrs of Abitina, Jerome, and Sulpicius Severus, besides those from the Ante-Nicene Fathers. It will be seen that few will have access to all the books from which these extracts are taken, even if they have the knowledge and the industry to master their contents.

The book is intended, we are told in the Preface, "for the use of lecturers and students in colleges, when it was not possible to assume such acquaint-

ance on the part of the students with Greek and Latin as would enable them to profit by documents in the original languages." To the student of either sex, or any age or condition, who wants to know something of the history of the early Church, but has not the desire or the opportunity to go into the matter very deeply, this volume will be a great help as it stands. To others who are prepared to devote some time and trouble to the matter, the book will be useful as a guide to trustworthy translations of nearly all the principal documents.

Of course, no book of this scope can satisfy completely every critic. Anyone at all familiar with the literature of the subject will find extracts, which he considers might have been omitted, and will look in vain for other passages, which he thinks ought certainly to have been inserted. That goes without saying.

The present writer feels that Dr. Kidd might have given more generous extracts from the Church Orders which have come into such prominence of late. He has given the Didache in full, but only one little extract from the so-called Egyptian Church Order, and nothing from the Didascalia Apostolorum. There are no other documents which throw so much light on the inner life of the early Church—its ministry, its services, its devotions, its organization, its charities, and its internal administration. More prodigality here would have been welcome, even at the expense of some cheeseparing elsewhere.

Dr. Kidd has given translations of the accounts of several martyrdoms which are well worth reproducing, being probably authentic and contemporary, but has omitted, no doubt from considerations of space, the Passion of St. Perpetua and her companions, perhaps the most vivid and interesting of all. There are, perhaps, no acts which throw so much light on the spirit of the martyrs, the domestic tragedies religion caused, life in prison, the relations of the prisoners to their gaolers and to their friends outside, and the ministrations of the deacon as the official representative of the Church.

We should also have highly appreciated some quotations from Porhyry the Neoplatonist, whose fragments relevant to Christianity, except the one given in the text, are inaccessible to the ordinary student. On the other hand, we are very grateful for the little fragment from Lucian's *De morte Peregrini*, which is often alluded to, but hardly ever quoted at any length; for the illustrations of the teaching of Paul of Samosata, taken from an article in the *Journal of Theological Studies*, apparently the work of Dr. Kidd himself; and for the fulness of the extracts which illustrate both the growth of creeds and the formation of the canon of Scripture, including the well-known Muratorian fragment. Many, also, will be glad to have the story of St. John and the Robber from the Alexandrian Clement, *Quis dives salvetur?* the correspondence between Trajan and Pliny on the Christians, the passage from Justin on the Eucharist, several famous passages from Irenæus and from Tertullian; besides one from Julius Africanus, and more than one from Origen, which show plainly enough that the Higher Criticism did not originate in Germany, and is a great deal older than the nineteenth century, and extracts from the *Canons of the Council of Elvira*, which throw much light on the internal condition of the Church just before the outbreak of the last and fiercest persecution.

One might, of course, argue that a Church History ought not to need such a companion, but should embody in its text, or notes or appendices, all necessary illustrative matter, but it is certain that Church History, as it is commonly written for the use of students, does need some such work as this, and to them it may be heartily commended.

C. P. S. Clarke.

SIR HOBBARD DE HOY. The Religious Education of the Adolescent. By Rev. E. F. Braley, M.A., LL.M. Macmillan. 1920.

Thanks is due to the author for bringing to the fore the religious problem of the adolescent. Childhood has come into its own, and a sheaf of literature may be had dealing with every phase of child life from almost any angle. Adolescence is coming into its own. For some years past clubs for both boys and girls in their teens have existed in all large towns; and the State has legislated for the regulation of the "young person's" employment. But his religious side has been treated spasmodically, successfully by some one or other with a special gift for this work, but on the whole unsuccessfully, as witness the distressing lapse of hundreds who as children were taught the Faith and its practice, but who do not take it with them when they bridge the gulf which separates school from working days. Unfortunately the author covers in a few pages ground which would take volumes adequately to survey; and from Cicero, on p. 1, leads us to the potential V.C. on the last, so that one is left a little bewildered and with a general impression that the "gang instinct" of adolescents must be considered at all costs, and that its only means of consideration is a Bible Class and a club. Here I for one would take issue with him, but his point may have been forced by the fact that the book is a reprint of lectures delivered before an interdenominational body. It is very open to question if all adolescents can be treated by the same general rule—distinctions may be odious, but they cannot be ignored. The public school boy or girl cannot be treated as their less (or should we say in these days, more) fortunate working brother and sister. The town boy is altogether different from the country boy. Different industrial types even need different treatment. But there is a point of contact for all, and that is that priest, teacher, or club manager must have as his constant inspiration a real love which will permeate whatever he does with, rather than for, his children. His own religion must be genuine, joyful and enthusiastic, entering into the commonplaces of everyday life; method then takes a secondary place.

Contrary to the opinion of the author, it is often true, though paradoxical, that the boy is appealed to through the emotions, the girl through the intellect. Both are hero-worshippers. Both love a crisis. It is an exceptional Bible Class which can fulfil these conditions, and complete the religious building of childhood which is to weather the storms of manhood; and at best it tends to become an end in itself instead of a means to an end. The Lord's Own Service on His Own Day fulfils all these conditions. It appeals to both the imagination and the reason. It provides opportunity for teaching. It affords the very highest possible Hero-worship. It is a service which provides a crisis, and it offers opportunity for individual service besides appealing to that "gang instinct"—a trait of adolescent character which the author rightly recognizes as of vital importance.

W. H. H. ELLIOTT.

SCIENCE AND LIFE. Aberdeen Addresses. By Frederick Soddy, M.A., F.R.S., Dr. Lee's Professor of Inorganic and Physical Chemistry, University of Oxford; lately Professor of Chemistry, University of Aberdeen. London: John Murray. 1920. Pp. ix+229. Price 10s. 6d. net.

Dr. Lee's Professor of Chemistry at Oxford has here collected addresses given during his time at Aberdeen to bodies as various as the University Scientific Association and the Aberdeen Branch of the Independent Labour Party. They are all built upon the common basis of one stupen-

dous fact, and suggest the consequences of that fact in the whole of life and thought. The fact, or group of facts, in the patient tracking out of which Professor Soddy has been no mean worker is radioactivity, and the chief consequence expounded is the partly increased control over Nature that has come into the hands of men, and must inevitably come in hardly imaginable measure in the future through their new knowledge of the infinite force that surges in the heart of the atoms, and the transmutations of what we have been accustomed to call the elements. The road of science upon which unrecognized pioneers set out with little thought of contributing to the material wealth of humanity has led to a treasury of inconceivable magnificence, which will be exploited not by the pioneers—their reward is generally infinitesimal—but by whom, and for what end? By individuals for their private advantage, and in horrors of war a thousandfold intensified, or by society as a whole for the common enrichment of life, and the perpetuation of peace?

It is obvious that an increase in our control over Nature, which conceivably may ultimately abolish the necessity for arduous work, must modify all conceptions of economics, politics, and education, and enter largely into philosophical and theological theory. But it must be equally clear to the calm thinker that victories won in the world of matter can only seriously affect what relates to our material condition. Professor Soddy, though by no means an unfair or one-sided dogmatist, is yet somewhat flushed with the material triumphs of his craft, and would carry his new revelation as a dissolving agency into the citadel of ancient philosophy and religion based on a spiritual revelation. It is true that he allows that science gives a basis for a theistic argument in its need for some principle of continuity, and argues reasonably for a belief in survival. But so far as physical nature is concerned he refuses to give God a foothold. God is not Force or Power. That which moves and transmutes itself in the animate world, and allows itself to be harnessed to the car of human needs, is something quite apart from the Divine. The confusion of Power and Will Professor Soddy thinks is a most harmful error in the clerical mind, and he girds himself to drive it out.

He has the true spirit of the pioneer; for him the kingdom of Truth is in the future, and must be won patiently and manfully. Of necessity there is a loss of proportion when he looks back upon the past, and regards a world governed largely by men educated in knowledge of the past. Hence clericalism is the enemy with its dangerous habit of instilling dogma into immature minds; the ancient Universities are the enemy with their preoccupation with classical studies, pretty things indeed for the relaxation of the few, but a poor equipment for those who are to lead the life of men. This alliance of the Church and classical study is unholy; it blocks the way of scientific progress by starving and reducing the number of pioneers, by providing a wrong type of public men, by tending to bolster up an evil capitalistic system—for Professor Soddy is an out-and-out communist—and by instilling false theological notions into the young.

Let us grant that Science is even now hardly done by, and that she should have a place more in the sun of our Universities, if only because of the incalculable treasure she brings to material life. Let us grant that in face of her new possibilities the chief activity of States should be to avert war. Let us grant that she should enter more widely into education.

But let us remember that important as "things" are, they are not so important as "ideas." "Man doth not live by bread alone." Professor Soddy's rather crude economics and cruder theology do not them-

selves really rest on his scientific discoveries, but on man's common property in ideas. As the control of "things" grows, "human" studies so-called become all the more important, as the issues of a greatly enriched society become all the more complex. The wider interests of history and literature, entwined as they are with the life and thought of the ancient world, contribute necessarily to the power of dealing with the problems of human life, which are in their essence the same. We cannot cut ourselves off from the past, and the ideas by which we live have been slowly hammered out in the evolution of the race. Whence comes the idea of Justice, on which Professor Soddy rests his attack upon capitalism? Not from Power and Control over Nature. It is part of the ideal foundation of life, to which Nature is subordinate.

God revealed in Jesus Christ, and more or less adequately represented in Church dogma, stands on a different plane to that of our deductions from the processes of Nature. He is Personal, Nature impersonal. We may agree with Professor Soddy that our system of religious education is by no means perfect. Yet the long experience of a society like the Church should count for something. At any rate we are firm on the point that in our Creed truth is assured of which philosophy based on science can only give dim suggestions.

But why should there be any conflict? Religion is surely not unwilling to withdraw her provisional teaching about Nature, in so far as that does not impair her witness to God's Immanence, Miracles, and Control of the material Universe

W. J. Ferrar.

Spiritual Freedom or Catholicity. By the Rev. Roger S. Kirkpatrick, B.D. Paisley: Alexander Gardner. 6d.

Article VIII.: Its Provisions and Safeguards. By a Parish Minister. Paisley: Alexander Gardner. 4d.

English Churchmen have watched with cordial sympathy the steps which have been taken towards the fusion of the two great Presbyterian Churches in Scotland, and have dared to look forward to a time when the movement of reconciliation across the Tweed would extend to the Episcopal Church. The two pamphlets before us raise a note of warning which seems not without cause. Mr. Kirkpatrick is joint author with Dr. Wotherspoon of a *Manual of Church Doctrine*, recently published by Messrs. Hodder and Stoughton, and shows himself to be well versed in the doctrine and ordinance of the Church of Scotland; and if it be the case that the *Articles declaratory of the Constitution of the Church of Scotland in Matters Spiritual* "declare a species of collective Independency as the acknowledged polity of the Church of Scotland," a step would have been taken which we could only regard with dismay. As Mr. Kirkpatrick says, "any province of the Catholic Church which organizes itself upon the basis of unrestricted spiritual freedom tends, as regards internal management and centralized control, to become a little papacy; while as regards external relations, it assumes the *uncatholic* status of a detached and self-contained sect—a sect which, although it expand to national dimensions, remains none the less automatically *cut off*—a self-separated sect, *totus teres atque rotundus*. Catholicity forbids this. It forbids the particular Church, in whatever sense, to consider itself as a complete Church, having full power within itself."

Mr. Kirkpatrick's point has probably been weighed and discussed by the authorities in the Church of Scotland, and there may be some answer which meets it satisfactorily. Meanwhile we welcome the frank avowal

that "Churches which desire to be thought Catholic should be more solicitous to exhibit *spiritual obedience* than to declare *spiritual freedom*; for only by that spirit can the self-propagation of schism be arrested and real advance towards Church unity accomplished."

STORIES FROM THE CHRISTIAN EAST. By Stephen Gaselee. Sidgwick and Jackson. 3s. 6d.

These nine stories, translated from Ethiopic, Coptic, Nubian, Greek, and Latin originals or versions, are admirably adapted to kindle the imaginations of children, and to bring home to them the wide distribution as well as the rich and humorous versatility of Christian tradition. The speaking illustrations in black and white by Mr. John Mavrogordato afford a succession of delightful surprises, and there is always the fun of making out what each detail means. We commend this volume to every nursery library.

BILLING AND SONS, LTD., PRINTERS, GUILDFORD, ENGLAND